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USING THE MASTER’S “TOOL” TO
DISMANTLE HIS HOUSE: WHY JUSTICE
CLARENCE THOMAS MAKES THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Angela Onwuachi-Willig*

Justice Clarence Thomas, the second black man to sit on the Supreme Court,
is famous, or rather infamous, for his opposition to affirmative action. His strongest
critics condemn him for attacking the very preferences that helped him reach the
Supreme Court. None, however, have considered how Thomas’s life itself may be used
as a justification for affirmative action. In what ways can the master’s “tool” be used
to dismantle his house?1
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1.
This phrase was coined by renowned feminist, Audre Lorde. See AUDRE LORDE,
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS & SPEECHES 110–13 (1984). By using the phrase “master’s tool,” I do
not mean to suggest that Justice Thomas is a puppet of the conservative Right in developing his
jurisprudence. Indeed, in a prior article, I defend Justice Thomas against criticisms that he is a
mere clone of Justice Scalia, arguing that his jurisprudence in certain areas is “raced” and is
rooted in black conservatism, which has a distinct history and foundation from white
conservatism. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice
Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 57–84, on file with Author). My use of the term “tool”
instead applies to the way Republican administrations have seemingly used Thomas, because of
his race, to advance their political goals, while simultaneously opposing affirmative action and
then viewing Thomas as “the epitome of the right kind of affirmative action working the right
way.” Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Supreme Discomfort, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2002,
at 24.
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This Article analyzes Justice Thomas’s appointment to the Supreme Court
and contends that his nomination to and performance on the Court ironically make
the case for forward-looking affirmative action. Specifically, this Article examines
various pro-affirmative action arguments, such as the benefit of cross-racial
understanding through interracial diversity, the destruction of stereotypes through an
exposure to intraracial diversity of viewpoints, and the redefining of traditional
standards of merit, and then utilizes such reasoning to explain how Justice Thomas
himself actually lends support to a continuation of forward-looking affirmative action.

INTRODUCTION
Justice Clarence Thomas is well-known for his opposition to affirmative
action,2 partially because he is a black3 man and such opposition is contrary to the
views of most Blacks,4 but mostly because he is a black man who is viewed as turning
his back on a policy that helped him advance to his current standing.5 To Justice
Thomas, the claim that he has pulled up the ladder of affirmative action after climbing
2.
By “affirmative action” I refer to the act of considering the race of
underrepresented racial minorities as a plus factor in hiring and recruitment and of broadening
standards of merit that are used to select persons for positions or programs. See Martha S.
West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 614 (1998) (describing
affirmative action as a “program or policy where race, national origin, or gender is taken into
account”); see also Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders, and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J.
119, 120 n.3 (2003). This Article draws upon case law and articles concerning affirmative
action in employment and education and focuses solely on “forward-looking” affirmative
action, not remedial affirmative action, which is designed to remedy past discrimination by a
school or employer. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 70–74 (2004) (analyzing and defending forward-looking justifications
for affirmative action); Sarah Stroud, The Aim of Affirmative Action, 25 SOC. THEORY & PRAC.
385, 386 (1999) (asserting that the aim of affirmative action should be viewed as the “forwardlooking” goal of eliminating “unwarranted attitudes that impede rational deliberation about
career choices and aspirations and thereby keep people from achieving their full potential”).
3.
Throughout this Article, I capitalize the word “Black” or “White” when used as
a noun to describe a racialized group. Also, I prefer to use the term “Blacks” rather than the
term “African-Americans” because the term “Blacks” is more inclusive. Additionally, “[i]t is
more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say,
between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to
maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the
Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
1043, 1073 n.4 (1992).
4.
See Poll: Public Split on Affirmative Action, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 2003
(stating that eighty-nine percent of Blacks still think affirmative action programs are
necessary).
5.
See Eugene Volokh, Judging Clarence Thomas, GLENNREYNOLDS.COM, June 30,
2002 (stating that “[l]ots of people have criticized Justice Clarence Thomas’ anti-racepreferences opinion [in Grutter] . . . on the grounds that there’s reason to think that he has
benefited from some such preferences”), at http://frontpagemag.com/articles/readarticle.
asp?ID=8646; see also Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Where Would Thomas Be Without
Affirmative Action?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 26, 2003, at B7 (asserting that
Thomas “could not make a powerful legal argument against racial preferences, given the fact
that he got into Yale Law School and got picked for the Supreme Court thanks to his race”).

2005]

JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS

115

it is unfounded because he has not been a beneficiary of the policy.6 Justice Thomas’s
supporters, such as Thomas Sowell, his mentor and a black senior fellow at the
Hoover Institute, agree, contending that affirmative action had not started at the time
that Thomas enrolled at Holy Cross College in Massachusetts and that no one has
proved that racial preferences played any role in Thomas’s admission to Yale Law
School.7
Thomas’s critics, however, vehemently contest these assertions, insisting that
a long line of facts prove that he has repeatedly benefited from racial preferences.8
According to these critics, Thomas benefited from racial preferences when he received
a scholarship to attend Holy Cross,9 when he received admission to Yale Law
School,10 and when he was appointed by President Ronald Reagan (despite
purposefully directing his career outside of civil rights and into areas such as tax

6.
See Justice Clarence Thomas, A Classic Example of an Affirmative Action Baby,
J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 31, 1998, at 35 [hereinafter Classic Example] (stating that
Justice Thomas has repeatedly denied being a beneficiary of affirmative action). In an
interview in the late 1980s, Thomas asserted, “This thing about how they let me into Yale—
that kind of stuff offends me. All they did was stop stopping us.” Juan Williams, A Question of
Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1, 1987, at 75. Thomas has also denied that race played a
role in his nomination to the Court. See JOHN GREENYA, SILENT JUSTICE: THE CLARENCE
THOMAS STORY 171 (2001) (noting that when Thomas was asked for his response to critics who
claimed that his seat on the Court was a result of a racial preference, “Thomas replied, ‘I think
a lot worse things have been said. I disagree with that, but I’ll have to live with it’”). But see
Classic Example, supra, at 36 (reporting that Thomas, whom the author asserts has engaged in
“revisionist” history, once stated in remarks to staff at the EEOC in 1983, “‘[b]ut for
[affirmative action programs], God only knows where I would be today’”).
7.
Classic Example, supra note 6, at 35.
8.
See, e.g., id. at 35–36. The irony in such assertions by Thomas’s critics, many of
whom are liberal, is that their comments are often made as insults, despite the fact that the
politically liberal position on affirmative action, unlike the conservative position, is that
affirmative action beneficiaries fully deserve the benefits they are awarded. Cf. Robyn E.
Blumner, Justice Thomas’s Dissent, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 29, 2003, at 7D (“[Clarence]
Thomas’s critics may snigger that he is sitting comfortably in one of the most powerful seats in
government, trying to tell everyone else to make it on merit. But this attitude only proves
Thomas right.”).
9.
See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 54 (stating that in the late 1960s, Holy Cross
“pushed to find and admit more black students under a relatively new policy known as
affirmative action”); ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 109 (2001)
(noting that clergy established a Martin Luther King scholarship fund days after Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s death to recruit students from inner city high schools). In fact, John E. Brooks, who
was President of the College of Holy Cross during Thomas’s tenure at the school, has
maintained that Thomas was “‘[c]ertainly’” a beneficiary of affirmative action in admission to
the college. Classic Example, supra note 6, at 35.
10.
Classic Example, supra note 6, at 36 (reporting that James Thomas, an
admissions officer at Yale Law School when Thomas applied in 1971, “has stated that ‘it’s
pretty clear’ that [Thomas] benefited from affirmative action during the admissions process”);
see also SCOTT D. GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 12
(1999) (asserting that Thomas was admitted under Yale Law School’s affirmative action plan
to recruit qualified minorities).
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law)11 to be the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education and later
Chairperson of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),12 both
agencies dedicated to protecting the civil rights of citizens.13 Moreover, there was that
embarrassing moment upon Thomas’s confirmation to a second term as Chairman of
the EEOC, when the Republican Assistant Attorney General Bradford Reynolds
toasted Thomas as “the epitome of the right kind of affirmative action working the
right way.”14
Above all of these positions, however, Thomas’s appointment to the U.S.
Supreme Court by the first President Bush in 1991 was the most controversial.15
11.
See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race,
25 S.U. L. REV. 43, 43 (1997) (describing Thomas’s desire to avoid any stigma associated with
race); Christopher Edley Jr., Doubting Thomas: Law, Politics and Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, July
7, 1991, at B1 (describing Thomas’s statement that he focused on corporate matters so he
would “not be ‘typed’ . . . [as] a civil rights specialist”).
12.
While not labeling these appointments as the result of affirmative action,
Thomas has conceded that race played a role in his appointments as Assistant Secretary for the
Department of Education and Chairperson for the EEOC. See THOMAS, supra note 9, at 186.
Prior to these appointments, Thomas had stated, “‘If I ever went to work for the EEOC or did
anything directly connected with blacks, my career would be irreparably ruined. The monkey
would be on my back to prove that I didn’t have the job because I’m black. People meeting me
for the first time would automatically dismiss my thinking as second-rate.’” Williams, supra
note 6, at 75. After accepting his jobs at the EEOC and the Department of Education, Thomas
explained his rationale for taking the positions, stating:
When I was asked to go to the Department of Education as well as come
here [the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission], you’re dang right I
was insulted. What other reasons besides the fact that I was black? But
then I had to ask myself, if you don’t do it, what are you going to say about
these issues in the future? If you had an opportunity to get in there and you
didn’t do it, what standing do you have to complain? As one friend put it to
me, “Clarence, put up or shut up.” And I wasn’t going to shut up.
THOMAS, supra note 9, at 186 (emphasis added). In 2000, Justice Thomas advised Brian Jones,
a rising black star in the Republican Party, not to accept a position as assistant attorney general
for civil rights because “[i]t was a black job.” Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Narrowly
Defined Image Belies Jurist’s Quiet Clout, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at A1.
13.
See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1.
14.
Williams, supra note 6, at 82 (describing Thomas’s reaction to Reynolds’s
statement as hurt and disgusted); see also GREENYA, supra note 6, at 127; Merida & Fletcher,
supra note 1.
15.
See Victoria Benning, Thomas Hearings’ Ripples Felt in Omaha for Blacks, the
Issues Reach Beyond Harassment, Race, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 17, 1991, at 1 (stating
that the “vote was narrower than any margin for a confirmed high court justice in more than a
century”). The most interesting rift over Thomas’s nomination was within the black
community. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1407 (1995) (noting that the National Bar Association, the premier
organization of black lawyers, was divided on Thomas’s nomination—128 opposed, 124
supported, and thirty-one took no position). Although traditional civil rights groups, such as the
NAACP, opposed Thomas’s appointment to the bench, polls showed that anywhere from fifty
percent to seventy percent of Blacks supported Thomas’s nomination. See Peggy Peterman,
Most Blacks Glad Thomas Confirmed, Now Want Him to Change, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
17, 1991, at 13A (“[M]ore [black people] were for Clarence Thomas than were against him, but
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Despite former President Bush’s declaration that Thomas’s race played no role in his
nomination,16 many viewed race as the ultimate explanation for Thomas’s
appointment to the Supreme Court.17 For example, at the time of Thomas’s
appointment, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden stated, “‘Had Thomas been white, he
never would have been nominated. The only reason he is on the Court is because he is
black.’”18 In all, Thomas’s critics viewed him as unqualified for the job,19 or at best,
minimally qualified for the job.20
it’s close. . . . [A] sizable number of black people say they simply want an African-American
on the U.S. Supreme Court. If it’s got to be a tarnished Clarence Thomas, so be it. That’s what
happens when it takes so long for a group of people, such as African-Americans, to get
recognition.”); see also THOMAS supra note 9, at 352 (noting that in July 1991, fifty-seven
percent of Blacks favored Thomas’s nomination, a higher percentage than of Whites);
Editorial, No Longer Invisible, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 28, 1991, at 6 (noting that between sixty
percent to seventy percent of Blacks supported Thomas’s confirmation). While some Blacks
feared Bush’s replacement candidate if Thomas did not succeed, others held out hope that
“Thomas ultimately would prove himself committed to the advancement of civil rights in his
decision-making on the Court.” Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 483 (2000).
16.
President George H.W. Bush proclaimed, “The fact that [Thomas] is black and a
minority had nothing to do with this in the sense that he is the best qualified at this time.”
THOMAS, supra note 9, at 346; see also JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 21 (1994). But see GREENYA, supra note 6, at 171 (stating that
President Bush was supposed to refer to Judge Thomas as the “best man” for the job instead of
the “best qualified”).
17.
See Edley, supra note 11 (“Those who oppose affirmative action . . . should
oppose the Thomas nomination, because only color can account for his selection.”); cf.
Manning Marable, Clarence Thomas and the Crisis of Black Political Culture, in RACE-ING
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 61, 64 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (“At best, Thomas’s
published writings revealed the working of a mediocre mind.”); Edward Lazarus, Making Sense
of Thomas’ Cross Burning Remarks and First Amendment Law, FINDLAW, Dec. 26, 2002
(noting “that Thomas’s qualifications, compared to those of other potential candidates, were
limited”), at www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/26/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.thomas. Many of
Thomas’s critics contend that his appointment to the bench was due to the combination of his
race and his conservative politics. See generally Gerber, supra note 11 (discussing how
Thomas’s critics perceived him).
18.
Classic Example, supra note 6, at 36.
19.
Professor Cornel West of Princeton University summed up many of the critiques
of those who opposed Thomas when he argued the following about Thomas’s qualifications:
“The fact that Thomas was simply unqualified for the Court—a claim warranted by his
undistinguished record as a student (mere graduation from Yale Law School does not qualify
one for the Supreme Court!); his turbulent eight years at the EEOC, where he left thirteen
thousand age-discrimination cases dying on the vine for lack of investigation; and his mediocre
performance during a short fifteen months as an appellate court judge—was not even
mentioned” in opposition to Thomas’s nomination. Cornel West, Black Leadership and the
Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 390–91 (Toni Morrison
ed., 1992).
20.
With the exception of George Harris Carswell (a Fourth Circuit Judge with a
history of supporting segregation), whose confirmation was rejected by the United States
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Putting Thomas’s qualifications for the bench aside, to say that race played
no role in his nomination to the Court is disingenuous.21 It would take conscious effort
to ignore the political pressures on the first President Bush to nominate a black
candidate to replace Thurgood Marshall, the Court’s first black Justice.22 Additionally,
although one would be hard pressed to argue that Thomas was unqualified for a seat
on the Court (especially because there is no required set of qualifications),23 Thomas,
despite having a very impressive career, arguably had not achieved the same overall
distinction in his legal career as most other Justices on the bench at the time of his
appointment.24 For example, though Thomas graduated from the elite Yale Law
Senate with a vote of forty-five to fifty-five, Thomas is the only Supreme Court nominee to be
rated by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) as simply “qualified.” Fax from Denise A.
Cardman, Senior Legislative Counsel of the ABA, Supreme Court Nominees (May 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Cardman Fax]. See also Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible
Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 121 (1993). Additionally, of all the nominees who were
ultimately confirmed to the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas is the only one who was not
unanimously voted as qualified. Twelve reviewers voted for him as “qualified,” two voted for
him as “not qualified,” one exercised a right of recusal, and none voted for him as “well
qualified.” Cardman Fax, supra. It is also worth noting that Republicans have argued that the
ABA committee that evaluates judicial nominees is systematically biased against conservatives.
Thomas’s age at the time—early forties—also may have affected his rating by the ABA.
21.
Amicus Briefs in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, in Support of the
University of Michigan: Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement
and Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 98
(2003) [hereinafter Brief Amici] (“No one can seriously dispute that, when the first President
Bush selected Justice Clarence Thomas to fill the vacancy left by the retirement of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Justice Thomas’s race was a factor—one among many—that President
Bush considered. No one can seriously contend it was entirely a coincidence that the second
African American ever to sit on the Supreme Court was selected to fill the vacancy created
when the first African American Justice retired . . . .”); see also Eva Jefferson Patterson,
Affirmative Action and the California Civil Wrongs Initiative, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 327,
336 (1997) (same).
22.
See THOMAS, supra note 9, at 347 (noting that Edwin Meese, a friend of
Thomas, conceded that “that the president was influenced somewhat by putting a minority on
the court[, b]ecause this was Thurgood Marshall’s spot”).
23.
See WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT
JUSTICES 21 (2004) (“There are no established criteria, tests, or guidelines for appointment to
the Supreme Court.”); Wells, supra note 20, at 119 (noting that “there is little consensus among
lawyers and scholars as to what should count as qualifications for a Supreme Court
appointment”).
24.
See Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J. 323,
339 & n.91 (2004) (highlighting that persons have asserted that “Justice Thomas ‘had a
relatively undistinguished career by Supreme Court standards’” and noting his disagreement
with that assessment) (quoting Mark A. Graber, Justice Thomas and the Perils of Amateur
History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 71 (Earl M. Maltz ed.,
2003)). See also Ifill, supra note 15, at 481 (stating that Thomas had not “[d]istinguish[ed]
himself in . . . the world of big law firm practice [or] academia prior to becoming a judge on the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals”).
This is not to say that qualifications that are traditionally considered to constitute high
distinction in law are necessary to serve as a Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, a significant
argument in this Article is that traditional standards of merit must be re-parameterized. See
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School, he did not graduate at the top of his law school class, unlike former Justice
Byron White, Justice Antonin Scalia, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, and Justice John Paul Stevens, who all graduated at the top of their
respective classes.25 Additionally, unlike many of his colleagues who had clerked for a
Supreme Court Justice or a federal appellate court judge, Thomas had never clerked
for a federal judge.26 Similarly, while Thomas had held significant leadership
positions such as Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of Education
and Chairperson of the EEOC,27 one could argue that he had not distinguished himself
as a fierce litigator, astute politician, or prominent scholar, as did some of his

discussion infra Part I.C and Conclusion. I borrow from scientists the term “re-parameterize,”
which means to shift or change the way a complex system is described or understood by
altering the primary components of a model of the system. See discussion infra Part II.C.; see,
e.g., Maxwell L. King & Thomas S. Shively, Locally Optimal Testing When a Nuisance
Parameter Is Present Only Under the Alternative, 75 REV. ECON. & STATS. 1, 1–7 (1993)
(applying the re-parameterization technique to two examples from econometrics literature and
demonstrating that their test has better power properties than tests previously proposed in the
literature).
25.
See THE SUPREME HISTORICAL SOCIETY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1789–1995, at 461–65, 486–525 (Clare Cushman ed., 1995)
[hereinafter SUPREME]. Upon his confirmation, Thomas joined Justices Harry Blackmun,
Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David Souter,
John Paul Stevens, and Byron White on the bench. Id. at 462, 487, 496–97, 512. Former Justice
Byron White, a Rhodes Scholar, graduated from Yale Law School magna cum laude. Id. at
462. Justice Antonin Scalia graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School and was a
note editor on the Harvard Law Review. Id. at 512. Chief Justice William Rehnquist graduated
first in his class at Stanford Law School, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor graduated third in
that very same class. Id. at 497. Finally, Justice John Paul Stevens graduated first in his class at
Northwestern University School of Law with the highest grades of any student in the law
school’s history. Id. at 502. It is important to note, however, that Yale had stopped giving letter
grades by the time Thomas attended the school.
Justice Thomas would later be joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer. Id. at 531–40. Justice Ginsburg, who graduated first in her class from Columbia Law
School and was an editor of the Columbia Law Review, led a distinguished career as a professor
at Rutgers Law School and later at Columbia Law School. Justice Ginsburg was a key player in
early sex discrimination litigation cases and won five of six Supreme Court cases involving sex
stereotyping before leading an equally distinguished career on the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See id. at 532–35. Justice Breyer, a Marshall Scholar who
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School and clerked for Supreme Court Justice
Arthur Goldberg, also led a distinguished career as a law professor at Harvard Law School,
worked as an assistant special prosecutor in the Watergate investigation, and developed a
reputation “as one of the leading jurists of his generation” during his fifteen years on the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See id. at 537–40.
26.
See id. at 462, 487, 497, 502. The late Justice White clerked for Supreme Court
Justice Fred Vinson, Rehnquist clerked for Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Stevens
clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, and Justice Harry Blackmun clerked for his
predecessor on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, John B. Sanborn. See
id.
27.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (detailing how Thomas himself
indicated that race was the primary factor in his obtaining these positions).
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colleagues.28 Finally, Thomas’s experience as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit was minimal; he served for less than two years on that court with
no evident impact.29 Thus, even Thomas’s most loyal supporters would have to
concede that, on some level, Thomas joined the Supreme Court under the “shadow” of
some racial preference.30
Regardless of whether one believes Justice Thomas or his critics about
whether he benefited from affirmative action, one question is never answered: why
does it matter? Even if Thomas were a beneficiary of affirmative action, that fact
would not forever bind him to support the policy.31 Therefore, why should anyone
care if Thomas benefited from affirmative action, other than to sneer at his opposition
to the use of racial preferences while those preferences were a factor in his
advancement to the Court?32
This Article provides one simple reason why one should care about whether
Justice Thomas was a beneficiary of affirmative action: that perhaps, the Justice
himself can be an argument for the legitimacy of affirmative action. To borrow
slightly from a phrase of former Republican Assistant Attorney General Bradford
Reynolds, Justice Thomas is, in certain ways, an example of affirmative action

28.
See SUPREME, supra note 25, at 487, 502, 512, 522–23; Mark Tushnet, A Tribute
to Justice Thurgood Marshall: Lawyer Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1277, 1277
(1992) (citing Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1991, at A1) (asserting that Marshall graduated first in his class at Howard University School
of Law and was a great trial lawyer and appellate advocate who “won 29 of 32 cases he argued
before the Supreme Court”).
29.
In contrast, it is reported that Blackmun wrote several notable opinions during
his eleven years on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; Stevens “gained distinction as a legal
craftsman” during his five years on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals; Souter served
successfully as a judge on the trial, appellate, and supreme courts of New Hampshire; and
Scalia was highly admired for his legal intellect while on the D.C. Circuit. See SUPREME, supra
note 24, at 464, 487, 503–04, 523–24.
30.
Throughout his adult life, Thomas made efforts to escape from this shadow. For
example, while at Yale Law School, Thomas avoided classes in civil rights and focused on tax
and antitrust courses to rebut what he perceived as his white classmates’ belief that black law
students were at Yale simply to fulfill a quota. See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 68, 94. As noted
earlier, after law school, Thomas deliberately did not seek legal work as a civil rights lawyer to
avoid any perception that his race played a role in his lawyering. See Gerber, supra note 11, at
44.
31.
See Volokh, supra note 5 (asserting that Justice Thomas has a duty to vote
against any policy he thinks is unconstitutional regardless of “gratitude”).
32.
See Sheryl McCarthy, Editorial, How Dare Justice Thomas Dissent on This One,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 26, 2003, at A40 (asserting that “[i]f Clarence Thomas really believes
what he said about the University of Michigan case, we should expect his resignation by the
end of the week”); Maureen Dowd, Editorial, Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2003, at 25 (“[Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter] is a clinical study of a man who has been
driven barking mad by the beneficial treatment he has received. It’s poignant really. It makes
him crazy that people think he is where he is because of his race, but he is where he is because
of his race. . . . It’s impossible not to be disgusted at someone who could benefit so much from
affirmative action and then pull up the ladder after himself.”).
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“working the right way.”33 After all, although Justice Thomas’s credentials were not
as distinguished as those of his peers on the Court in a conventional sense,34 he cannot
be completely faulted for this “lack” of qualifications. Like many beneficiaries of
affirmative action,35 Thomas faced numerous obstacles that may have prevented him
from obtaining certain credentials.36 For example, when Thomas graduated from Yale
Law School in 1974, there were very few black federal judges37 who could hire law
33.
Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1. In other ways, Thomas is not a good example
of “affirmative action working.” See discussion infra Conclusion.
34.
Given consistent and harsh criticism regarding Thomas’s lack of qualifications
for the bench during and after his appointment, I expected to find a huge disparity between
Thomas’s credentials and those of his peers, but, on the contrary, I found that the disparity was
not as wide as I originally imagined, if not minimal. For example, prior to their appointments to
the United States Supreme Court, neither White nor Rehnquist had any judicial experience. See
SUPREME, supra note 25, at 462–65, 487.
35.
Beneficiaries of race-based affirmative action (which is intrinsically linked to
class) often face numerous obstacles, including daily societal discrimination; impoverished
schools, lacking not only in luxuries such as Advanced Placement or Honors courses but also in
necessities, such as books; standardized test scores that predict race and class more than
performance; and lowered expectations based on racial stereotypes from teachers. See Dawn R.
Swink, Back to Bakke: Affirmative Action Revisited in Educational Diversity, 2003 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 211, 253–54 (2003) (describing the disadvantages that many black, Latino, and
Native American students must overcome). Some have argued that affirmative action primarily
benefits middle-class minorities who do not face many of these obstacles. See Walter Benn
Michaels, Diversity’s False Solace, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at 13 (contending that “[w]hen
students and faculty activists struggle for cultural diversity, they are in large part battling over
what skin color the rich kids should have”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 n.3
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the law school’s
admissions process “does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher
education”). Even if one accepts this assertion, there are numerous studies that demonstrate
that, when wealth is defined in terms broader than just income alone, including assets, prestige
of job and education level required for job, savings, retirement, and so on, Blacks and Latinos
are far from being in the same position as Whites. See generally MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 100–10
(1995) (asserting that when factors other than income are included, black families are
significantly worse off than white families with similar incomes); R. Richard Banks,
Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1068 (2001) (pointing out that “middle class blacks hold dramatically less
wealth than whites with comparable education and income” and that “[l]ow socioeconomic
status whites, as measured by education and income, have a wealth-holding comparable to
many middle class blacks”); see also Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action: Diversity of
Opinions: Affimative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939,
967–88 (1997) (same); Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2487,
2537–38 (2003) (book review) (same).
36.
See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1 (detailing some of the obstacles that a poor
Thomas faced).
37.
In May of 1974, there were sixteen black judges out of 506 judges on the federal
bench: twelve district court judges, three circuit court judges, and one Supreme Court Justice.
See PETER BARNETT, LAW CLERKS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATE APPELLATE
COURTS: AN AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY RESEARCH STUDY 7 (1973) (indicating the number
of federal judges in 1973); see also Elaine Jones & Edward B. Toles, Presidential
Appointments of African-American Article III Judges (Jan. 30, 2003), at www.jtbf.org/
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clerks,38 and even fewer white judges who were hiring black law clerks at the time,39 a
problem that still remains to this day.40 Additionally, as Thomas himself has noted,

pres_appt.htm. Even in present times, Blacks make up a small percentage of all federal judges.
See James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 169
n.68 (2003) (asserting that the number of black federal district judges was thirty-four in 1992
and seventy-one in 2001 and the number of black federal appellate judges was nine in 1992 and
twelve in 2001).
38.
Many black judges have taken a special interest in hiring minority law clerks.
See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality, and Representation
on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 139 & n.241 (1997) (“Similarly, the presence of
African American judges often corresponds to a marked increase in the hiring of African
American court personnel.”); see, e.g., Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Promoting Diversity as the
Ultimate Means of Achieving True Equality for All Persons in the Nation, 50 FED. LAW. 47, 49
n.19 (2003) (“An outstanding example of such a mentor is Senior Judge Damon Keith of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, who, over his 35 years on the bench, has had 61
minority judicial law clerks—African-American, Asian, Hispanic, American Indian, and Arab
American—out of 72 judicial law clerks.”); James O. Freedman, Thurgood Marshall: Man of
Character, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1487, 1497 (1994) (noting that Justice “Marshall chose more
black and minority law clerks than any other Justice, and many of these men and women now
serve on the faculties of the nation’s leading law schools,” including Professor Randall
Kennedy of Harvard Law School and Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School); J. Clay
Smith, Jr., United States Foreign Policy and Goler Teal Butcher, 37 HOW. L.J. 139, 148 &
n.42, 148 (1994) (recording that “Hastie’s first law clerk, John R. Wilkens, was black,” that
Goler Teal Butcher was “the first black woman to clerk at the federal circuit level,” and that
“Hastie’s selection of Professor Butcher is an example of how a racially diverse judiciary
expanded the opportunities of talented black men and women to federal and state judicial
clerkships”).
39.
See Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 GEO. L.J. 2109,
2126–27 (1992) (pointing out that “[p]rior to Marshall’s appointment, only one AfricanAmerican had served as a law clerk to any of the Justices”).
40.
Several years ago, the United States Supreme Court Justices were heavily
criticized for the low number of minority clerks. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Different
Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the
McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53, 69 n.77 (1999)
(describing the NAACP’s protest against the Justices’ hiring practices); see also Tony Mauro,
U.S. Court Justices Grilled Over Lack of Diversity Among Clerks, N.J. L.J., Mar. 20, 2000, at
11 (reporting on a congressional hearing concerning the paucity of minority law clerks selected
by Supreme Court Justices); cf. Randall Kennedy, The Clerkship Question and the Court, AM.
LAW., Apr. 1999, at 114 (noting that the paucity of minorities in the highest circles of the legal
profession is a problem but asserting that it stems from many sources, “including the social
inequities that effectively bar all too many blacks from any higher education . . . and customs
and reflexes that make it more difficult for black students to gain access to the valuable social
networks that advance careers in the law”). The lack of minority law clerks is especially
significant, given the important role that clerks make in assisting judges in their decisions. See
generally JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN
COURTS (1980) (investigating how clerks may influence judges in making decisions).
Justice Thomas, who has had one black law clerk since his appointment and has one
incoming black clerk, Larry Thompson, Jr., has suggested that “the dearth of black law clerks
[i]s attributable less to race and more to class.” Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1.

2005]

JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS

123

after his graduation he encountered vicious racism as a black man seeking a law firm
job in his home state of Georgia.41
Yet based on Thomas’s rise from Pin Point, Georgia, to Yale Law School to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Thomas had at least demonstrated that
he had the potential to become a good Supreme Court Justice with an independent
judicial voice and to make unique contributions for the Court.42 The only question is,
how has he met the task?
This Article analyzes Justice Thomas’s appointment to the Supreme Court
and contends that Justice Thomas’s seat and performance on the Court ironically make
the case for forward-looking affirmative action. Part I examines and discusses several
of the arguments that proponents of affirmative action assert in favor of the policy, in
particular, enhanced learning and performance as a result of interracial diversity, the
negation of stereotypes about group viewpoints as a result of exposure to intraracial
diversity of perspective, and a rejection of traditional standards of merit. Part II of this
Article then explicates the various ways in which Justice Thomas, a “tool”43 of sorts
41.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 41–42) (noting that Thomas
had been rejected by every law firm in Atlanta and that Thomas still has those rejection letters
in his possession). It bears noting that Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg experienced similar
discrimination when they sought jobs upon their graduation. As Justice Ginsburg once
remarked, after O’Connor graduated near the top of her class at Stanford Law School, “no
private firm would hire her to do a lawyer’s work.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on
Women’s Progress in the Legal Profession in the United States, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 14 (1997)
(quoting O’Connor as saying “‘I interviewed with law firms in Los Angeles and San Francisco
. . . but none had ever hired a woman before as a lawyer, and they were not prepared to do
so’”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1217, 1219 (1992) (describing the gender discrimination she experienced “when law
firms would only hire [her], a ‘lady lawyer,’ as a legal secretary”). Like O’Connor, despite her
excellent credentials, Ginsburg also experienced difficulty finding a job. She “received no job
offers from New York law firms” and was not “able to obtain a clerkship interview with a
Supreme Court Justice.” SUPREME, supra note 25, at 532. Ultimately, District Court Judge
Edmund L. Palmieri hired her as his law clerk. See id.
In response to criticism about the lack of minority law clerks at the Supreme Court, Justice
Thomas once replied, “‘I would love to see the day when I have . . . four minority clerks who
can hold their heads up proudly and high around that Court and say, ‘I am here under the same
criteria, doing the same job, and I’m just as good as anybody else here.’’ He added, ‘I think any
member of the Court would be proud of that.’” Tony Mauro, Clerks: Minority Ranks Rise,
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, at 10.
42.
See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas: First Term, First Impressions,
35 HOW L.J. 115, 120–21 (1992) (indicating “that initial bewilderment [on the Court] is less
likely to occur for new Justices with prior judicial or political experience” and that Thomas’s
“extensive service as chairman of the EEOC and his tenure . . . on the D.C. Circuit” were good
preparation for the Court).
43.
As noted earlier, my use of the term “tool” applies only to the way Republican
administrations have used Clarence Thomas, because of his race, to advance their political
goals, while simultaneously opposing affirmative action. Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1. In
fact, as several scholars have explained, the Bush administration used Thomas’s race and class
background to defend his nomination. See Yxta Maya Murray, The Cultural Implications of
Judicial Selection, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 374, 379–81 (1994) (analyzing Thomas’s confirmation
process and how it was infused with race consciousness). For example, as Professor Kendall
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of the Bush administration (which vigorously opposed affirmative action),44 makes the
case for forward-looking affirmative action, including through his own jurisprudence.
Finally, this Article identifies the various ways in which Justice Thomas’s career may
not serve as a good defense for affirmative action, in particular, the ways in which the
Justice’s life does not advance several of the reasons underlying the support of race
consciousness in admissions and hiring, including through judicial appointments. This
Article then concludes with a discussion of the ways in which Justice Thomas,
through his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger,45 has laid the foundation for truly
transforming selection criteria in schools and in the workplace.

I. IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
If affirmative action means what I described, what I’m for, then I’m for
it.
—George W. Bush46

Forward-looking affirmative action programs in employment and admissions
have evolved over a period of more than forty years. This Part of the Article focuses
and reflects on selected arguments in favor of forward-looking affirmative action,
such as the contribution of differing perspectives based on racial diversity and the
manner in which intraracial diversity of perspective helps to defeat racial stereotyping
about what is the “minority viewpoint.” Part I.A provides a brief history of the
development of race-based affirmative action in the United States and addresses
certain pro-affirmative action arguments as they relate to the benefits of diversity. Part
I.B then describes such views as they relate to expanding traditional standards of
merit.
A. Brief History of Affirmative Action
The term “affirmative action” as it relates to race discrimination was first
used in 196147 when President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10,925,48

Thomas of Columbia University School of Law illustrated, Thomas’s qualifications for the
court were often framed in terms of his rise from poverty and against discrimination. See
Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 380 (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992) (quoting Senator John Danforth as stating “‘Nobody here was born black in the
segregated South. Nobody here was raised in a shack for 7 years without plumbing, in a broken
home. Nobody knows that. Nobody has experienced that. Clarence Thomas has.’”).
44.
See Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing
Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 679,
690–91 (1996) (noting that, during the first Bush administration, forces favoring affirmative
action dominated); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Phillip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action,
and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 10
(2001) (“Although Reagan’s successor, George Bush, promised ‘a kinder, gentler presidency,’
White House opposition to affirmative action continued unabated during his administration.”).
45.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
46.
George W. Bush, Presidential Debates in St. Louis, Missouri (Oct. 17, 2000),
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000c.html.
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which required that any contractor with a federal contract of $10,000 or more “take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, creed, or national
origin.”49 Although the term “affirmative action” was first linked to racial
discrimination in President Kennedy’s 1961 executive order, its creation was actually
part of a long line of executive orders that were intended to expand employment
opportunities for Blacks.50 Such efforts to improve job opportunities for Blacks began
twenty years earlier with President Franklin Roosevelt’s issuance of Executive Order
880251 in 1941, which was promulgated in response to the demands of black labor
leaders.52
Thus, when President Lyndon Johnson expanded the policy of affirmative
action by issuing the famous Executive Order 11,246,53 the environment was ripe for
the new order’s procedures.54 Eventually, by the mid-1960s and early 1970s,
affirmative action had spread into the educational arena.55 Soon, with Executive Order
11,246 and certain other regulations permitting the use of voluntary policies in the
absence of prior discrimination,56 forward-looking affirmative action programs
developed across the nation and eventually evolved into policies that consciously
acknowledged race and gender in an effort to increase minority and female
participation in contracting, employment, and education.57

47.
The term had previously been used in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
which authorized the NLRB to provide “affirmative action” remedies, such as reinstatement of
employees in the event of unfair labor practices by management. M. ALI RAZA ET AL., THE UPS
AND DOWNS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PREFERENCES 8 (1999); see also West, supra note 2, at
612–13.
48.
Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6,1961).
49.
Id.
50.
See RAZA ET AL., supra note 47, at 7.
51.
Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25,1941).
52.
See The Executive Order Program, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (1971).
53.
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sep. 24, 1965).
54.
See Robert M. Berdahl, Policies of Opportunity: Fairness and Affirmative
Action in the Twenty-First Century, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 115, 117 (2000) (“Linked to the
provision of equal opportunity, affirmative action was meant to counterbalance the many years
in which equal opportunity had been denied to African-Americans by many forms of
institutionalized racism.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1159, 1161–63 (1996) (discussing the various goals of
affirmative action).
55.
See West, supra note 2, at 619; Swink, supra note 35, at 214–15.
56.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) (1973) (“Even in the absence of such prior
discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome
the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race,
color, or national origin.”).
57.
See Susan Low Bloch, Looking Ahead: The Future of Affirmative Action, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 1507, 1507 n.3 (2003). For example, in 1970, the Department of Labor required
employers with fifty of more employees to create timetables and establish goals for hiring
minority workers. See id. But see Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables:
Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 405–11 (1987) (arguing why
goals and timetables will not end employment discrimination).
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Moreover, these programs were recognized and upheld by the Supreme Court
in cases such as United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.58 In Weber, a group of
white plaintiffs challenged a voluntary affirmative action program that was a hybrid
remedial and forward-looking program in that it was adopted to eliminate traditional
patterns of racial segregation but not any particular discrimination by the employer
itself.59 The program required that fifty percent of all openings in “in-plant” craft
training programs be reserved for Blacks until the percentage of black craft-workers
was commensurate with the percentage of Blacks in the local labor force.60 The
plaintiffs alleged that the program discriminated against them in violation of Title VII
because it placed an unfair burden on Whites.61 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
their claims.62 In so doing, the Court asserted:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation’s concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those
who had “been excluded from the American dream for so long,” . . .
constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy.63

Just one year earlier in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,64 the
Supreme Court, through Justice Powell’s decision, explicitly recognized one of the
benefits of forward-looking affirmative action in education when it described the gains
that could be garnered from a diverse body of students who could bring varying
perspectives based upon their backgrounds.65 In that case, Alan Bakke, a white male
in his thirties, filed a lawsuit against the University of California at Davis Medical
School, alleging that the school’s admissions policy was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause because it reserved certain seats in its entering class for
minority students,66 thereby causing his rejection by the medical school.67 In the end,
the Court, with a fifth vote from Justice Powell, upheld the lower court’s decision to

58.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
59.
See id. at 201.
60.
See id. at 199, 208.
61.
See id. at 197–201.
62.
See id.
63.
See id. at 204. In Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616 (1987), the Supreme Court later upheld a voluntary affirmative action program, which
included women.
64.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
65.
Id. at 321–22 (including in Justice Powell’s Appendix the Harvard College
Admissions Program description, which stated that “[t]he belief that diversity adds an essential
ingredient to the educational process has long been a tenet of Harvard College admissions”);
see also Karst, supra note 2, at 60 (asserting that the Powell opinion “justified the consideration
of race as one factor in a public university’s admissions process designed to produce diversity
in its student body for educational purposes”).
66.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276–78.
67.
Bakke had applied to twelve medical schools, including the University of
California-Davis. See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective,
87 GEO. L.J. 981, 985–86 (1999). Bakke was rejected by all twelve schools. The next year
Bakke focused his energies on Davis alone. Id.
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admit Bakke into medical school.68 At the same time however, the Court, also with
Powell’s vote, overturned the lower court’s prohibition on race consciousness.69
Asserting that it was not necessary to set aside a certain number of seats to obtain a
racially diverse student body,70 Justice Powell proclaimed that schools could use race
to obtain a more diverse entering class.71 In so doing, he quoted from a catalogue of
Harvard College, noting that, “‘[a] farm boy from Idaho can bring something to
Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually
bring something that a white person cannot offer.’”72
As time progressed and challenges to non-remedial affirmative action
programs flourished,73 proponents of affirmative action articulated numerous other
benefits of non-remedial policies, expounding upon the principles of diversity and
cross-racial understanding that Justice Powell expressed in Bakke.74 These precepts
are practically limitless and include factors such as the preparation of persons for

68.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320; see also Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke
Matter? Affirmative Action and Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 697, 702 (1998) (asserting that “Powell provided the fifth vote for one issue from each
bloc [of Justices on the Court], and his opinion became the controlling opinion”).
69.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–20; see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Will Affirmative Action
Survive?, LEGAL TIMES, June 17, 2002, at 24 (stating that Justice Powell concluded that “some
attention to race was constitutional to achieve a diverse student body”).
70.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
71.
Id. at 314–15; see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Race-Based Affirmative Action
in American Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 444 (2001) (asserting that Powell’s
opinion held “that race could be a plus factor in admissions”).
72.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 324 (2003).
73.
Within the past ten years, numerous interest groups have mounted an attack
against voluntary affirmative action programs in the courts. See Swink, supra note 35, at 211
(declaring that “affirmative action is under the most serious attack it has endured in decades”);
Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action in the Education
Arena, 42 HOW. L.J. 451, 451 (1999) (noting that opponents of affirmative action have been
waging war on the policy in the courts). The attack has also occurred outside of the courtroom,
and the bases of these attacks range from claims of reverse discrimination to the imposition of
damaging stigma on minority students to claims regarding the unfair admission of unqualified
students. In 1996, Ward Connerly, then a Regent of the University of California, rallied
Californians to vote for Proposition 209, which prohibited the use of racial preferences in
public employment, education, and contracting. Connerly and his followers have also targeted
other states, such as Michigan. See Susan E. Eckes, Race Conscious Admissions Programs:
Where Do Universities Go from Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 55 (2004) (“In
response to the U.S. Supreme Court Grutter case, Ward Connerly and other conservative
activists plan to sponsor ballot initiatives, similar to that of California’s Proposition 209, which
bans racial preferences. In addition to Michigan, Connerly hopes to have three or four such
ballot measures on state ballots by November 2004. As it stands, the Grutter decision has no
direct effect on California’s public colleges or universities because of Proposition 209. The
state of Washington has passed a similar measure.”); Pratt, supra, note 73 at 460 (describing
the success of anti-affirmative action initiatives in California and Washington); see also Wing,
supra note 71, at 446–47 (same).
74.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316–26.
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work and leadership in an increasingly diverse society,75 enhanced performance and
learning through the inclusion of all people,76 confidence in the integrity of
educational institutions and workplaces,77 the negation of racial labels about
“minority” jobs or roles,78 the defeat of racial stereotyping about the existence of a
monolithic minority viewpoint through an exposure to intraracial diversity of
opinion,79 an expansion of traditional standards of merit,80 compensation for wrongful
75.
See Karst, supra note 2, at 60, 66–68 (reporting that the Supreme Court reasoned
that the “inclusion of substantial numbers of minority students in the universities is a matter of
compelling importance . . . because the universities are gateways to leadership in American
institutions” and stating that “valuing diversity has helped the bottom line”); see also Grutter,
539 U.S. at 330 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae for American Educational Research Association
et al. at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)) (noting that “numerous studies show that
student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals’”).
76.
See Karst, supra note 2, at 67 (describing the use of affirmative action in the
armed services and noting that “the inclusion of minority officers in all levels of the officer
corps” improved the services’ performance). See generally Patricia McKeown, Diversity in the
Workplace: What Does It Mean for Your Bottom Line?, WISC. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 10–11 (“The
diversity experts, major law firms across the country and corporate law departments all say the
same thing: it’s time to wake up and smell the bottom line. Diversity isn’t just a nice idea. It’s
becoming an issue of competitiveness, with the most diverse firms getting the edge in an
increasingly diverse marketplace.”); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN.
L.J. BUS. & FIN. 85, 90–131(2000) (arguing that diversity can be managed to enhance
productivity and that the business community has taken the lead in this effort); see also
Chander, supra note 2, at 165–77 (arguing that the reasons why the law protects minority
shareholders are also the reasons why the law should sometimes promote affirmative action for
minority races). But see Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 351, 363 (2004) (deconstructing the shareholder wealth argument as it applies to
diversity and affirmative action and explicating the dangers in “founding a racial agenda on
nonracial values”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1559 (2004) (arguing that “there are also good
reasons to believe that black lawyers who maintain a normative understanding of diversity that
goes beyond corporate self-interest may also have important advantages in building a credible
‘business case’ for diversity in their own careers”).
77.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy
in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide
this training.”).
78.
See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 10 ASIAN
L.J. 127, 134 (2003) (asserting that “[a] further harm of segregation and underrepresentation is
the perpetuation of detrimental stereotypes, continuing the myth that certain groups are
inherently incapable of attaining certain accomplishments or performing certain jobs”). See
also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1149, 1155 (2003) (same). Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae of American Federation of Labor &
Congress of Industrial Organizations in Support of Respondents, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz
(No. 02-516) (providing social science evidence to show that students who attend diverse
schools are less likely than others to think in terms of racial stereotypes).
79.
See Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 215, 220 (2004)
(translating the arguments in Grutter to the corporate context and asserting that “cooperation
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injuries caused by societal discrimination,81 a greater likelihood that historically
disadvantaged groups will receive needed services and donations because individuals
tend to be most charitable to members of their own racial and ethnic groups,82 an
increased number of role models for all young people, especially minorities,83 and an
acknowledgement and understanding that merit can be defined in various ways.84
B. The Benefits of Diversity
Although, as noted above, numerous arguments have been articulated in
favor of affirmative action, the hallmark of most forward-looking affirmative action
policies is diversity. The importance of achieving diversity through affirmative action
has been repeatedly detailed in numerous articles and books85 and, most recently, in

among diverse co-workers builds interpersonal bonds, combats stereotypes, and promotes
understanding and empathy across racial lines”); Karst, supra note 2, at 71 (“Sustained daily
association with another person in carrying out a joint task takes you beyond the point where
you look at that person and see nothing but a racial or ethnic label; as you become wellacquainted with the whole person, the label fades. And when this sort of interaction is
multiplied across more and more individuals’ experience, the labels will lose their importance
on a larger scale.”).
80.
See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal
Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 963–70 & passim (1974) (arguing that the idea of merit is not
self-defining and is not limited to only certain types of past performance).
81.
See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 855, 865 (1995) (analyzing corrective justice as a rationale for affirmative action).
82.
See Paul Brest, Some Comments on Grutter v. Bollinger, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 683,
683–86 (2003) (stating that individuals tend to give to organizations that support “groups with
which they identify on the basis of characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and religion”); see
also Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 867–72 (same).
83.
See Chen, supra note 78, at 134 (“[D]iversity provides role models for those
historically excluded. It can provide a source of hope and inspiration for those who would
otherwise limit their horizons and aspirations.”). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at
1165–66 (same); Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig, Bird Creates Buzz About Race in the NBA: The
Importance of Role Models is Evident Even in Pro Basketball Careers, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jul.
6, 2004, at B7 (discussing the need for role models in sports and schools). The Supreme Court
has rejected the “role model” argument as a basis for using race in layoffs. See Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). In dissent, Justice Stevens argued in favor of
the constitutionality of a program that worked to provide an integrated faculty, asserting that
there is “a critical difference between a decision to exclude a member of a minority race
because of his or her skin color and a decision to include more members of the minority in a
school faculty for that reason.” Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
84.
See Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates
of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 214–24 (2003) (urging a re-evaluation of
admissions choices).
85.
See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998);
Brest, supra note 82, at 683–85 (discussing why diversity is important to legal education);
Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Rollin’ on the River: The Limits of “A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools”, 11 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 5–9, on file with Author).
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the Supreme Court’s decision, Grutter v. Bollinger.86 As previously mentioned, the
pronounced benefits of diversity are manifold, including enhanced knowledge and
learning among participants of differing backgrounds because of exposure to diverse
perspectives,87 an increased ability to work and live with persons of different
backgrounds,88 the destruction of racial stereotypes about intellectual capacity and
viewpoints,89 and recognition that merit can be defined in many ways.90
In defending affirmative action, proponents contend that interracial diversity
is critical in promoting understanding across racial lines because it helps to ensure
meaningful representation of people who belong to marginalized racial groups and
who may bring perspectives that persons outside of their group may not hold.91 Such
diversity, these supporters contend, enables individuals to empathize with people who
are different than they are and to relate to them in a way that one can only relate to
another person in the flesh.92 After all, when people interact regularly across racial
lines, they learn to appreciate their similarities and differences,93 and they learn to
86.
539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (“[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.”).
87.
See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin: Summary and Conclusions, Grutter (No.
97-75928), available at http:/www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/expert/summ.html
(asserting that “[s]tudents who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in classroom
settings and in informal interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in active
thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and motivation, and growth in
intellectual and academic skills”).
88.
See Karst, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that an educational advantage of student
diversity is “the preparation of graduates for a society and a work force that are growing more
and more diverse”).
89.
See Swink, supra note 35, at 211 (stating that learning with “people from
different walks of life and diverse backgrounds . . . helps [to] destroy racial stereotypes and
animosity”).
90.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 134 n.87 (noting that there are many ways to
define merit and that “[m]erit is contextual and a function of institutional mission”).
91.
See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1158–61 (detailing how a person’s
viewpoint is influenced by racial identity and how diversity may shape the content of
discussions); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319 (same).
92.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 1163 (stating that discussions about race and
affirmative action in his constitutional law class were vastly different when a significant
number of minorities were present and that his “students learned more and benefited more from
the discussion when minority students were present”); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 n.48
(quoting President William Bowen of Princeton University) (“[A] great deal of learning occurs
informally. It occurs through interactions among students of both sexes; of different races,
religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states and
countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able,
directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise graduate
of ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational process, ‘People do not learn
very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves.’”).
93.
See Brest, supra note 82, at 685 (arguing that “[a] class drawn from various
backgrounds allows students to appreciate commonalties as well as differences among their
classmates, and to learn to communicate across racial boundaries”).
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communicate and work across socially constructed racial boundaries.94 Moreover,
prejudice against and the alienation of certain racial minorities can be reduced,95 and
stereotypes about the abilities of certain groups or their belonging are more easily
defeated when there is increased interaction among people of various races.96 For
example, students who are exposed to competent minority teachers are less likely to
hold onto negative stereotypes not only about the intellectual capacities of minority
teachers but also about their minority peers.97 In fact, some studies have demonstrated
that the recruitment of women and minorities under affirmative action programs has,
in various instances, helped to reduce the beliefs of certain white men in the inferiority
of other groups.98
Additionally, racial and ethnic diversity serves as a constant reminder of the
need to be inclusive in all aspects of life.99 As Dr. Patricia Gurin explained on behalf
of the University of Michigan in Grutter, students who are educated in racially and
ethnically diverse educational environments are also more likely to interact with a
diverse group of friends, live in diverse neighborhoods, and work in diverse places of
employment.100 In other words, not only do students in integrated schools gain new
perspectives on particular issues from their peers and learn how to co-exist with
different people as a result of diversity, but students and workers in diverse
environments also better learn how to interact with clients and constituencies that are
becoming increasingly more diverse within our global society.101

94.
See Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 862 (exploring the rationales for
affirmative action and how they apply to different racial groups).
95.
Id. at 863.
96.
See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1155–56 (describing how diversity
disrupts negative social meanings about race).
97.
See Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325,
329 (2002) (“When non-minority students were not exposed to outstanding minority teachers,
they too easily harbored distorted views of minority students as intellectually deficient.
Likewise, some nonminority faculty had confused views of minority students, because they had
had no occasion to work with minority peers of equal standing in the profession.”). Cf. Alice
M. Noble-Allgire, In Pursuit of Justice Powell’s Vision: Diversity-Conscious Admissions Is
Just the First Step, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 255, 272 (2003) (asserting that a “lack of
diversity on the faculty sends a powerful, unspoken message about who is entitled to . . .
respect and authority within the law school and within the legal profession as a whole”).
98.
See Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 870–71 (referring to a study of the
California Parks and Recreation Department) (citation omitted).
99.
See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1154 (“Racial diversity has the
potential to facilitate inclusion.”); Chen, supra note 78, at 134 (noting how diversity helped the
ACLU broaden its agenda to include “the rights of women, gays and lesbians, and language
minorities”).
100.
See Gurin, supra note 87 (“Students educated in diverse settings are more
motivated and better able to participate in an increasingly heterogeneous and complex
democracy. . . . Students with the most diversity experiences during college had the most crossracial interactions five years after leaving college.”).
101.
See Estlund, supra note 79, at 220 (“Where diversity is a given among the
multiple constituencies with which a firm’s employees interact—suppliers, contractors,
customers, and employees scattered throughout the far-flung units of a global enterprise—the
experience of working with diverse co-workers will prepare employees to deal more effectively
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Finally, in addition to improving cross-racial understanding, proponents of
affirmative action assert that meaningful diversity assists in breaking down racial
stereotypes because it forces people to learn that there is no “‘minority viewpoint’ but
rather a variety of viewpoints among” minorities.102 In so doing, it teaches majority
and minority members alike that not all people of the same race think or act the same.
Moreover, it helps to display the range of political thought among racial minorities
and within each racialized group103 and helps to enrich understanding of issues by
ensuring the representation of numerous voices.104 Indeed, this argument in favor of
affirmative action supports a central tenet of Critical Race Theory that there is not just
one voice, but many voices that should be valued in society.105 More importantly, as
many race scholars have argued, this rationale recognizes the need for including many
voices within legal discourse, including many voices of color.106
C. Re-Parameterizing Traditional Standards of Merit
As well as outlining the benefits that flow from diversity, proponents of
affirmative action also point to the way in which the policy helps schools and
businesses focus on what is relevant in predicting performance,107 or more
importantly, in helping these places fulfill their educational and workplace
missions.108 In essence, the use of affirmative action and the performance of its
with those constituencies.”); cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585–602 (1990) (detailing the dangers and disadvantages in not
including the voices of women of color in feminist legal theory).
102.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003) (quoting Dean Kent Syverud of
Vanderbilt University Law School).
103.
Id.
104.
See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 566 (2001)
(arguing that it is important for law to address the exclusion of individuals who seek both to
retain cultural membership and to pursue freedom from discrimination and repression within
their cultural communities).
105.
See John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the Population in the
Twenty-First Century, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1413–14 (2002) (noting that a “need exists
to theorize about the relationship between groups of color and methods of giving their lived
experience voice” but maintaining that the black-white paradigm can be useful in exploring the
subordination of all people); see also Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled
Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 (2004)
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 8–12, on file with Author).
106.
Cf. Juan F. Perea, The Black White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1219–53 (1997) (asserting that it
is critical for discussions on race to extend beyond the black/white binary).
107.
See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 101 (1997) (“[M]erit should include the talents of
those without privilege. . . . A good affirmative action plan broadens the definition of
qualification, expanding the pool of talent available for any given opportunity.”). Cf. Susan
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84
CAL. L. REV. 953, 969 (1996) (indicating that standardized tests do not identify qualities
important for the education the test takers seek).
108.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 160, 194–97 (arguing that structural mobility
“focuses society’s educational resources on those who are most likely to fulfill the aims of
democracy”).
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beneficiaries help to demonstrate that individual merit itself is not self-defining109 and
is not limited to any particular category of standards.110 As Justice Powell himself
acknowledged about Harvard College’s program in Bakke, affirmative action can
direct a place to consider a broad range of qualities in determining merit, including
“exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential,
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”111 In sum,
affirmative action may ensure that the characteristics sought in prospective applicants
for schools and jobs truly predict whether those individuals will make the kinds of
contributions that the institutions want them to make by creating a space in which
other important factors, such as an individual’s efforts in overcoming significant
socioeconomic obstacles, can be considered in the selection process.112
The expansion of merit standards in affirmative action programs uncovers the
fiction of a truly meritorious system.113 As several scholars have argued, merit is not a
race-neutral concept,114 but rather a set of standards in any particular context where
decision-makers have deferred to “social preferences about what constitutes value and
how that value is produced.”115 In many instances, traditional “merit standards were
developed by dominant social groups, in ways that [were intended to]
disproportionately benefit[] their descendants.”116 For example, Professor Daria
Roithmayr has revealed through a study of the history of law school admissions
exactly how powerful individuals in the dominant group developed subjective social
109.
See Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 582 (2002) (acknowledging that merit can have
many meanings).
110.
See Karst, supra note 2, at 62 n.8 (arguing that merit should be defined as
potential fulfillment of social needs).
111.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978).
112.
See Lani Guinier, Confirmative Action, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 565, 572–75
(2000) (stating that a Michigan study has confirmed that affirmative action is “a better method
for identifying qualified lawyers than conventional techniques” and forces a school to consider
what it “is attempting to do when it then educates or trains the applicant who becomes a
student”).
113.
Id. at 565 (arguing that a generational study on the careers of University of
Michigan Law School Graduates revealed “that conventional test-based admission policies both
mask and support deep flaws in the way we allocate opportunity and privilege”).
114.
Guinier, supra note 84, at 121 (asserting that current normative conceptions of
merit are arbitrary); Banks, supra note 35, at 1034 (noting that “[m]erit is necessarily defined
with respect to particular contexts, goals, and values”).
115.
Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1454, 1473 (1998) (highlighting the fact that “for merit to do the job of
rewarding ability and creating social value (and thereby displace bias), it must depend on and
defer to subjective, arbitrary, status-oriented, culturally-specific definitions of ‘social value’”).
See also Guinier, supra note 84, at 134 (same); PATRICIA A. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS 98–99 (1991) (same).
116.
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83
GEO. L.J. 1711, 1718, 1721 (asserting that “[m]erit is what the victors impose”). See also
Roithmayr, supra note 115, at 1475-94 (examining the history of law school admissions to
prove that merit standards are the result of subjective, race-conscious preferences for particular
kinds of abilities).
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standards of merit for the purpose of excluding immigrants and Blacks from the legal
profession.117 Specifically, Professor Roithmayr demonstrated how a direct effort to
exclude Blacks, Latinos, and Eastern and Southern Europeans spawned the creation of
the American Bar Association, “selective institutions,” and aptitude tests and also
shifted American legal education from one based on practical experience to one based
on abstract legal reasoning.118 Indeed, as was detailed in Professor Roithmayr’s
article, such efforts proved extremely successful in locking out minorities from the
legal profession, even though small numbers of minorities had previously succeeded
in those jobs.119 For example, although in 1900 the state of Mississippi had twentyfour black lawyers and South Carolina had twenty-nine, after more than forty years of
changes designed to exclude racial minorities from the law, those numbers had
dropped to three and five, respectively, by 1940.120
Finally, as many proponents of affirmative action have asserted, traditional
merit standards should be reevaluated, not only because they are often based on biased
social factors and values, but also because they do not correlate highly with an
individual’s success in a particular field.121 For example, a recent study at an elite law
school disclosed that the LSAT explained only fourteen percent of the difference in
first-year grades.122 Likewise, scholars Richard Lempert, David Chambers, and Terry
Adams discovered in their study of graduates of the University of Michigan Law
School that traditional factors, such as LSAT scores, had almost no relation to
measures of post-law school success for minority students who were admitted in part
because of affirmative action.123 In fact, the authors found that after graduation such
minority students paralleled their white peers in advancement to positions of
responsibility and in satisfaction with their careers, and outperformed their white peers
in terms of service to and giving back to the community, another frequently cited
benefit of affirmative action.124 In sum, these studies support what this Article refers
to as the need for a “re-parameterization” of merit standards by revealing the
weaknesses in factors that have been traditionally used for admission and hire. Much
like scientists might change the parameters used to model a complex system when it is
discovered that the old model does not appropriately describe its behavior, we must
117.
See Roithmayr, supra note 115, at 1475–94.
118.
See id.
119.
See id. at 1483–84.
120.
See id. at 1484.
121.
See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 107, at 969.
122.
See id. at 971 (referring to a study completed at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School); see also William C. Kidder, The Rise of Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT,
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 187
(2000) (asserting that the LSAT predicts sixteen percent of the difference).
123.
David L. Chambers et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The
River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 401–02, 459–63, 492–503
(2000); see also Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest: 10 Reasons
Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (And Why Other Good Law Schools Should Follow
Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 593, 598 (2001) (asserting that the LSAT does not test all
relevant skills and also measures some that are irrelevant).
124.
Chambers et al. supra note 123, at 443–47, 453–59, 468–503; see also Richard
Lempert et al., Myths About . . . Affirmative Action, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2001, at 27–29
(contradicting five myths of affirmative action with the results of their empirical investigation).
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begin to re-parameterize the selection standards that we use for schools and jobs as we
learn more about the failures of such standards.125

II. ISN’T IT IRONIC?
And life has a funny, funny way of helping you out . . . helping you
out.
—Alanis Morrisette126

Many of the previously described arguments attach with equal force to
judicial selections,127 including when viewed in relation to Justice Thomas’s life. This
Part of the Article first considers how certain pro-affirmative action concepts apply to
courts and the judicial selection process and then demonstrates how Justice Thomas’s
career, and even selected portions of his own dissent in Grutter, support the
continuation of forward-looking affirmative action.
A. But All the Judges Are “Raced”128
As noted above, many of the arguments regarding racial diversity in schools
and workplaces can be transferred to a discussion of racial diversity on the bench.129
For example, in the same way that interracial diversity in schools and in the workplace
can promote cross-racial understanding and improve learning and performance due to
differing perspectives, “[d]iversity on the bench can enrich judicial decision-making
by including a variety of voices and perspectives in the deliberative process.”130 As
Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit once
explained, “it is inevitable that judges’ different professional and life experiences have

125.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the term “reparameterize”).
126.
Alanis Morrisette, Ironic, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick/Warner 1995).
127.
See Ifill, supra note 15, at 405–37.
128.
The term “raced” means that the views and approaches of all judges are
influenced in part by their race or races, just as they are by other factors, including but not
limited to class, gender, and sexuality. Specifically, the term “raced” rejects the idea that
Whites, unlike Blacks and other minorities, are neutral, objective, and uninfluenced by race.
See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969–80 (1993).
129.
See generally Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 21–
30); Ifill, supra note 15, at 405–37; Ifill, supra note 38, at 124–27 (asserting that racial
minorities could seek to compel states to adopt affirmative action judicial selection plans).
130.
Ifill, supra note 15, at 405; see also Ifill, supra note 38, at 99; see also LINN
WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE BENCH 83–84 (1994)
(“Black judges also bring a perspective that is sorely lacking in their absence. They bring some
perspective, some insight from a segment of the community that has simply gone
unrepresented. This perspective is born out of an experience that one has had growing up in a
Black community as opposed to a white community.”). Judge Jerome Frank also once declared
that men are not stripped of all their prejudices, biases, and influences simply because they are
wearing a black robe and have taken the “oath of office as a judge.” In re J.P. Linahan, Inc.,
138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943).
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some bearing on how they confront various problems that come before them.”131
Thus, judges of all races will bring their understanding of people, human experience,
and even their own experiences with race and the law to the bench with them.132
Furthermore, Professors Sherrilyn Ifill, Kevin Johnson, and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
have argued that because the idea of pure judicial neutrality is a myth,133 it is
imperative that courts, including the Supreme Court, are comprised of individuals who
represent a cross-section of the country—with differing views that are undeniably
influenced by life experience.134 According to Judge Damon Keith of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, even Justice Thomas himself has acknowledged the importance of
increasing the number of minority judges, once proclaiming, “we have to get more
Blacks on the federal bench.’”135 In fact, in 1998, Justice Thomas proved his
commitment to diversity on the bench when he, at the request of his friend Judge
131.
Edwards, supra note 97, at 325, 329 (also explaining that an assertion that racial
diversity betters our system for justice is not the same as saying race routinely influences the
decisionmaking of judges).
132.
See Chen, supra note 78, at 136–38 (describing how one judge’s experience as
a child watching his grandfather be humiliated because of limited English-speaking skills
informed that judge’s understanding of language discrimination). Cf. Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35 n.4 (1994) (noting that “Blacks are likely to be somewhat aware
that law has played a role in maintaining racial privilege” and that “Whites, although aware that
racial subordination is a problem, are unlikely to view racism as a constant or central feature of
American life”).
133.
See Ifill, supra note 38, at 97 (noting that “[d]iversity efforts are [often]
countered with the argument that judges are impartial and thus need not be representative of
particular racial groups”). Cf. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical
Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals
Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 511, 542 (2003)
(“‘When people are asked to describe themselves in a few words, [black] people invariably
note their race and white people almost never do. Surveys tell us that virtually all [black]
people notice the importance of race several times a day. White people rarely contemplate the
fact of our whiteness—it is the norm, the given. It is a privilege to not have to think about
race.’”) (quoting Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV.
603, 604–05 (1999)); Ifill, supra note 15, at 424 (noting that Whites, in being considered the
norm in society, have the privilege of seeing themselves as “neutral, unbiased, or impartial”).
134.
See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 30–38)
(analogizing judges to juries and arguing that, much like with diversity of juries, “pulling a
group of judges from a cross section of the community may . . . benefit the decision-making
process”). As Magistrate Judge Edward Chen of the Northern District of California, the first
Asian Pacific American to be named to the federal bench in that district, once asserted, the
federal bench is incredibly lacking in diversity. As of September 30, 2001, out of nearly 1,600
active federal judges, including Article III, magistrate, bankruptcy, and court of claims judges,
only 7.2% were Blacks, 4.0% were Latino/as, 0.8% were Asian-Americans, 0.1% were Native
Americans, and none were Pacific Islanders. See Chen, supra note 78, at 129 (noting that in
“contrast, according to the 2000 census, African Americans were 12.3% of the U.S. population,
Latinas/os were 12.5%, Asian Pacific Americans were 3.7%, and Native Americans were
0.9%”).
135.
Wiley Henry, Judge Thomas Weathers Protest Storm, TRI-STATE DEFENDER,
Aug. 5, 1998, at 1A (describing Judge Keith’s introduction of Justice Thomas at the National
Bar Association Convention in 1998).
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Keith, made important phone calls to Senators Orrin Hatch and Trent Lott to ensure
the confirmation of U.S. District Judge Victoria Roberts, then a black female Clinton
nominee whose nomination had been held up for a year by Republicans.136
More importantly, racial diversity on the bench can actually help to secure
impartiality “by ensuring that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial
decision-making.”137 Having judges of different races on the same court, especially on
appellate courts where panels of judges decide cases, exposes each judge to different
approaches and views on cases and can result in any one judge seeing an issue or
point that the judge on his or her own may have disregarded. Indeed, such interaction
may ultimately change the way in which a judge will vote and thus the outcome of a
case.138 In sum, racial diversity on the court enhances judicial deliberations not only
because it increases the chance of bringing different perspectives to the courtroom, but
also because it likely influences the scope and manner of discourse amongst judges.139
In fact, numerous studies have demonstrated how life experiences and the
perspective from which a judge may analyze a case can affect his or her vote,
particularly in non-unanimous cases.140 For example, in one such study of federal
appellate courts between 1981 and 1996, Nancy Crowe, a Radcliffe Institute Fellow at
136.
See Kevin Merida & Michael A. Fletcher, Thomas’s Across-the-Aisle Aid
Puzzles Even the Beneficiaries, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2004, at A15; see also Merida &
Fletcher, supra note 12 (stating that “Thomas has intervened or offered help on behalf of
several stalled African-American judicial candidates” including Yale Law School classmate,
Judge Eric Clay of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit).
137.
Ifill, supra note 15, at 411. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 94, 352–56 (2003) (“The nation contains such a diversity of moral and
political thinking that the judiciary, if it is to retain its effectiveness, its legitimacy, has to be
heterogeneous, and the members of a heterogeneous judicial community are not going to
subscribe to a common set of moral and political dogmas that would make decisionmaking
determinate.” (emphasis in original)).
138.
See Chen, supra note 78, at 136–38. But see Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L.
Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82
SOC. SCI. Q. 749, 749 (2001) (finding that there were small sentencing effects based on the race
of the judge and that there was also much similarity in sentencing practices, although black
judges were more likely to sentence both white and black offenders to prison).
139.
See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 78, at 1159 (“People with different racial
identities have different experiences and thus view the world differently”); Edwards, supra note
97, at 329 (arguing that the presence of black judges changes our system of justice for the
better). See also GERBER, supra note 10, at 6 (arguing that political preferences affect the
jurisprudence of judges and asserting that “Justice Thomas’s acclimation period on the
Supreme Court reveals . . . that judging and writing about judging are inherently political
activities”).
140.
See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench
in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 601–10, 617 (2003) (describing several
recent empirical studies concerning the effect of judges’ races on judicial decision-making but
noting that “[i]n the majority of cases—many of which are routine and resolved by
settlement—race and gender of the judge likely will not affect outcomes”). Cf. Edwards, supra
note 97, at 329 (asserting that five to ten percent of cases can be categorized as hard and more
likely to be influenced by a judge’s personal views). This is not to say that minority judges are
any less impartial than white judges; to say that a judge brings a different perspective to a case
does not mean that a judge fails to follow the law. See id. at 328.
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Dartmouth College, found that the race of a judge could affect how he or she voted on
race and sex discrimination cases.141 Overall, Crowe determined that black judges,
because of the unique perspective they gain from experiences with racism,142 are more
likely to vote for plaintiffs than white judges in both race and sex discrimination
cases.143 Specifically, she found that black male judges are even more likely to vote
for sex discrimination plaintiffs than white female judges.144 Moreover, Crowe
concluded that there were noticeable differences in the voting behavior of black and
white judges in race discrimination cases, with black judges voting for plaintiffs
ninety percent of the time, while white judges voted for plaintiffs only forty-one
percent of the time.145 Crowe, who also determined that partisanship played a strong
role in judges’ votes on race discrimination cases,146 discovered that even black
Republican judges were more likely to vote for a race discrimination plaintiff than a
white male or female Democratic judge.147 In essence, Crowe found that a judge’s
race and experiences with race could and did play a significant role in the way that a
judge approached a case, interpreted issues, and, in some instances, reached a
conclusion.148
Likewise, Professor David Oppenheimer conducted a study of California
employment law cases that revealed how race, specifically that of the juror, judge, or
plaintiff, can affect the outcome of a case.149 Relying in part on previous studies

141.
Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision
Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981–1996, at 80, 83 fig.3.1 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the University of Chicago Library). But see
Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District
Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 144–46 tbls.2–3 (2000) (studying pairs of Clinton
appointees based on race and/or gender and finding no statistically significant difference
between black and white Clinton district court appointees).
142.
See Crowe, supra note 141, at 84 (“If African-American judges have
experienced discrimination during their lifetimes, they may feel affinity for other victims of
discrimination. . . . If the life experiences of African-Americans give them a unique perspective
on discrimination, that perspective is apparently not limited to members of their own social
group, it applies to others who find themselves similarly situated as well.”).
143.
See id. at xiii, 80, 83 fig.3.1 (reporting that “85 percent of the votes by AfricanAmerican judges were cast for plaintiffs, compared to 45 of the votes of white judges”).
144.
See id. at 83 fig.3.1.
145.
See id. at 137, 110–11, 114 fig.4.1.
146.
See id. at 80, 83 fig.3.1 (finding, for example, that a white male Republican
judge voted for the sex discrimination plaintiff only twenty-eight percent of the time, while a
white male Democratic judge voted for the plaintiff seventy-six percent of the time, and that
white male Democratic judges voted for race discrimination plaintiffs forty-nine percent of the
time while white male Republicans judges voted for the plaintiff only twenty percent of the
time).
147.
Compared to black male Republican judges, who voted for the race
discrimination plaintiff sixty percent of the time, white male Democratic judges voted for race
discrimination plaintiffs only forty-nine percent of the time, and white female Democratic
judges voted for the plaintiffs only slightly more at fifty-one percent. See Crowe, supra note
141, at 114 fig.4.1.
148.
See id. at 80–84, 110–115, 83 fig.3.1, 114 fig.4.1.
149.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 133, at 513–17.
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conducted by Professor Michael Selmi,150 Professor Oppenheimer determined that the
fact that only 200 out of 1600 active federal judges were people of color played a role
in the outcomes of discrimination cases tried between 1995 and 1997, verdicts in
which plaintiffs had a success rate for plaintiffs of forty percent before a jury and only
nineteen percent before a judge.151 He further concluded that the fact that seventyseven percent of all California Superior Court judges were white152 ultimately
influenced how cases were shaped before state juries,153 which found for non-white
plaintiffs in only thirty-six percent of all race discrimination cases as compared to
fifty-three percent of all employment discrimination cases and in only twenty-five
percent of race termination cases as compared to forty-seven percent of all termination
cases.154
In addition to these studies, several Supreme Court Justices have noted the
way that one’s personal experience and attributes can influence judicial deliberations
and decision-making.155 For example, Justice O’Connor once expressed to a group of
female visitors at the Court that having Justice Ginsburg on the Court made “a night
and day difference” for her.156 Furthermore, with respect to race, several Justices have
remarked on the importance of the unique perspective that the late Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the first racial minority to sit on the Court,157 brought to the bench.158 For
example, Justice Lewis Powell once articulated how Justice Marshall’s “unique
150.
See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
151.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 133 at 558–59.
152.
See id. at 558.
153.
See id. at 558–59.
154.
See id. at 542–43.
155.
See Edwards, supra note 97, at 329 (“And in a judicial environment in which
collegial deliberations are fostered, diversity among the judges makes for better-informed
discussion. . . . A deliberative process enhanced by collegiality and a broad range of
perspectives necessarily results in better and more nuanced opinions―opinions which, while
remaining true to the rule of law, over time allow for a fuller and richer evolution of the law.”).
But see Crowe, supra note 141, at 141-42, 153-57, 156 fig.5.2 (strangely finding that the
presence of a black judge on a panel had a “negative impact on the decision making behavior of
white male judges in race discrimination cases, [as a] panel composed entirely of white males
was more likely to rule for a race discrimination plaintiff than a panel that included one African
American judge”).
156.
Crowe, supra note 141, at 1 (citation omitted). The visitors were the women on
the United States Olympic Basketball Team for 1996. See id. Justice O’Connor said to them, “I
can’t tell you how happy I was when she [Justice Ginsburg] got to the court. It makes a night
and day difference to have women on the bench.” Id.
157.
See Kevin R. Johnson, On Appointment of a Latina/o to the Supreme Court, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (noting that Thurgood Marshall was the first black
Supreme Court Justice).
158.
See, e.g., Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Dream Makers: Black Judges on Justice, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1996) (quoting Justice Harry Blackmun as describing the “precious
quality that the black justice had brought to the Court . . . [as] Marshall was the only justice
who had ever defended a murder suspect . . . [and] [h]e was the only justice who had defended
and worked with so many poor women that he actually knew how they suffered financially,
were pained emotionally, [and] often became psychological wrecks over knowledge that
another baby was on the way” (internal citation omitted)).
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contribution” to the court derived from his “direct experience with racial segregation
in this country.”159 Additionally, in her tribute to Justice Marshall in the Stanford Law
Review, Justice O’Connor described how the late Justice “profoundly influence[d]”
her, a woman who prior to Brown v. Board of Education160 had not been exposed to
racial tensions and “had no personal sense . . . of being a minority in a society that
cared primarily for the majority.”161 As O’Connor so vividly explained about the
effect that Marshall had on the Court:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories
and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. His
was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the social
fabric and used law to help heal them. His was the ear of a counselor
who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused and established
safeguards for their protection. His was the mouth of a man who knew
the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. At oral arguments
and conference meetings, in opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall
imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences,
constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the
persuasiveness of legal argument but also to the power of moral
truth.162

Similarly, the late Justice Byron White described the impact that Justice Marshall’s
voice had on him as a jurist, noting:
Thurgood brought to the conference table years of experience in an
area that was of vital importance to our work, experience that none of
us could claim to match. Thurgood could tell us the way it was, and he
did so convincingly, often embellishing with humorous, sometimes
hair-raising, stories straight from his own past. He characteristically
would tell us things that we knew but would rather forget; and he told
us that we did not know due to the limitations of our own experience.163

159.
BARBARA A. PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT?: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 137–38 (1991) (citing an interview with
Justice Powell in which he argued that diversifying the bench with previously excluded groups
can bring new insights to the court).
160.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161.
O’Connor, supra note 41, at 1217.
162.
See id. at 1217 (emphasis added).
163.
Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1215, 1216 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Johnson, supra 157, at 3 (quoting Justice
Brennan as saying: “What made Thurgood Marshall unique as a Justice? Above all, it was the
special voice that he added to the Court’s deliberations and decisions. His was a voice of
authority: he spoke from first-hand knowledge of the law’s failure to fulfill its promised
protections for so many Americans.”); Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall,
44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1992) (noting how Justice Marshall reminded the other Justices
of their “moral obligation as a people to confront those tragedies of the human condition which
continue to haunt even the richest and freest of countries”); cf. Ifill, supra note 15, at 448
(detailing how Justice Ginsburg claimed that “female justices would compel the men to ‘[l]ook
at life differently’”) (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice (CNN
television broadcast, Aug. 10, 1993)).
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Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who often found himself on the opposite side
of Marshall, has cited the late Justice’s “insightful perspective on key issues of our
time” as a contribution to the Court.164
Apart from the influence of diversity among their colleagues, judges can also
be significantly influenced by insights they may gain from racial diversity in their
personal lives. In fact, Dean Peter Alexander of Southern Illinois University School of
Law described a rather compelling story about such effects on Chief Justice Warren
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.165 As Dean
Alexander wrote in a speech presented as part of a commemoration of the fiftieth
anniversary of Brown:
Sometime before the Court announced the first of the Brown decisions,
Chief Justice Warren decided to go to Virginia to tour Civil War sites.
His Black chauffeur drove him from Washington, D.C., to the various
sites. At the end of the first day, he checked into a hotel and assumed
that his driver would do the same. The next day, the Chief Justice
found his driver in the car and learned that he had spent the night not in
a hotel but in the car because he couldn’t find accommodations for
himself in segregated Virginia. Warren said of his reaction upon
hearing this: “I was embarrassed, I was ashamed.”166

No huge leaps are required to see that this cross-racial experience surely
affected Chief Justice Warren, not only causing him to change his vacation plans by
cutting his trip short and immediately returning to Washington, but perhaps his
personal understanding of racism, for “[h]e had come as close as any White person
could to the racial discrimination to which a Black man was commonly subjected and
he did not like it.”167
Although many persons may disagree with Justice Thomas’s philosophies
and opinions, his presence on the Court supports a continuation of forward-looking
affirmative action in the sense that he too brings a diverse perspective to the Court due
to his racial background.168 In the same way that Justice Marshall brought a special
perspective to the Court based on his personal experiences with racism,169 Justice
164.
William H. Rehnquist, Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1213, 1213 (1992).
165.
347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Supreme Court held that segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 493–95.
166.
Peter C. Alexander, From Brown to Topeka to the Future, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 219,
221 (2004).
167.
Id.
168.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84) (demonstrating that
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on certain issues is steeped in black conservative thought,
which has a history and foundation that are distinct from white conservatism). See generally
Mark Tushnet, supra note 24 (arguing that traces of black nationalism exist in Justice Thomas’s
opinions).
169.
See Edwards, supra note 97, at 328 (“[B]lack judges may sometimes bring a
unique vision to the judicial deliberative process. Because of the long history of racial
discrimination and segregation in American society, it is safe to assume that a disproportionate
number of blacks grow up with a heightened awareness of the problems that pertain to . . . areas
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Thomas (who, by the way, is well-known for citing great black leaders such as
Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois in his opinions)170 also brings a unique, black
conservative perspective to the Court today.171 Indeed, as Justice Powell once spoke of
Thurgood Marshall, some of Justice Thomas’s unique views stem from his
experiences with racial segregation and discrimination.172 In fact, much like Justice
Marshall, Justice Thomas has shared during deliberations a philosophy on
desegregation that has clearly been shaped by his own personal experiences in Jim
Crow schools.173 For example, during a conference on Missouri v. Jenkins,174 a case in
which the Supreme Court determined that a desegregation order designed to attract
more students from the suburbs was beyond the remedial authority of the district
court,175 Justice Thomas passionately added:
I am the only one at this table who attended a segregated school. . . .
And the problem with segregation was not that we didn’t have white
people in our class. The problem was that we didn’t have equal
facilities. We didn’t have heating, we didn’t have books, and we had
rickety chairs. All society owed us [were] equal resources and an equal
opportunity to make something of ourselves. . . . The evil of
segregation was that black students had inferior facilities, not that they
were denied the chance to go to school with white students. . . . All my
classmates and I wanted . . . was the choice to attend a mostly black
school or mostly white school, and to have the same resources in
whatever school we chose.176

of the law,” such as equal opportunity and discrimination, standing, and criminal law).
Additionally, although there has never been a Latino/a, Asian-American, or Native American
Justice on the Court, a nominee from any of these racialized groups would also likely bring a
“special” perspective to the Court. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript
at 9–12); Johnson, supra note 157, at 2–3, 7–14 (discussing how a Latino/a Justice may bring
new perspectives to the Supreme Court).
170.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting a speech Frederick Douglass delivered to a
group of abolitionists); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting W.E.B. DuBois).
171.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84) (demonstrating that
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence on certain issues is steeped in black conservative thought).
172.
My comparison of Justices Marshall and Thomas is not to suggest that Justice
Thomas’s appointment or service on the Court has had the same impact as that of Justice
Marshall, who could never be replaced. See Joan Biskupic, Thomas Caught Up in Conflict;
Jurist’s Court Rulings, Life Experience Are at Odds, Many Blacks Say, WASH. POST, June 7,
1996, at A20 (noting that Professor Stephen Carter, Yale Law School Professor and former law
clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall, has said that “many people still will not forgive [Thomas]
for not being Thurgood Marshall” and that “Thomas was never going to be able to fill the shoes
of the distinguished civil rights lawyer”).
173.
Cf. GERBER, supra note 10, at 198 (“Justice Thomas is . . . an especially
fascinating example of the realist maxim that judges read their policy preferences into the law
they are interpreting.”).
174.
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
175.
See id. at 91–92.
176.
Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996, at 66.
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While Justice Thomas was wrong to note that he was the only one to have attended a
segregated school,177 his perspective on segregated schools was certainly unique
among the other Justices at the table, many of whom may have attended segregated
schools, but not because of their entire race’s perceived inferiority.178 To that end,
Justice Thomas’s comments likely forced his peers to view the case from a different
angle, thereby advancing one of the goals of affirmative action by shaping his
colleagues’ approach to a case and enriching the discussion of legal issues.179
Similarly, Justice Thomas brings to the Court a unique ideology on
affirmative action, which has seemingly been influenced by his experiences at Yale
Law School (whether consciously or unconsciously).180 In the past, Justice Thomas
openly discussed his feelings about the stigma he believed affirmative action caused
for him at Yale, describing his days there as trying to get a “monkey” off his back
because he believed that his classmates felt he was there only because of his race.181
These same points about stigma have materialized in Justice Thomas’s opinions on the
Supreme Court. For example, in his concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena,182 Justice Thomas referred to what he believed to be the policy’s stigmatizing
effects, claiming that affirmative action programs “stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority” and “engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the
government’s use of race.”183
Again, in Grutter, Justice Thomas reemphasized that he believed all
minorities were considered undeserving because of affirmative action and asserted,
perhaps thinking of how he has been perceived by much of the public,184 that there is
always an open question of whether skin color played a role in the advancement of
any high-achieving person of color.185 In fact, much like Justice Marshall, Justice
Thomas has not been shy about sharing his views on affirmative action during
deliberations, which undoubtedly have somewhat shaped the Justices’ discussions of
these cases. For example, during deliberations on Adarand, Thomas used his personal
experiences to appeal to his colleagues on the Court, discussing his life with his
177.
Of course, an all-white school is segregated, too.
178.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal quotations omitted)
(noting that racial segregation is “usually interpreted as denoting inferiority of the [N]egro
group” and this “sense of inferiority . . . has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of [N]egro children”).
179.
See discussion supra Section I.A.
180.
See Mary Kate Kearney, Justice Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger: Can Passion
Play a Role in a Jurist’s Reasoning?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 15, 32–35 (2004) (arguing that
Justice Thomas’s personal experiences with affirmative action are evident in his jurisprudence
and that they strengthen his voice in the debate).
181.
Williams, supra note 6, at 74.
182.
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
183.
Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
184.
See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1–2 & nn.6–9) (stating that
Thomas has repeatedly been described as lacking independent thought and has been referred to
as Scalia’s clone, puppet, and even “bitch”).
185.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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grandfather and stating “[my] grandfather had worked hard, . . . he never asked for
handouts from the state. He hadn’t made a great living, and his business had been
restricted to black neighborhoods; but he had not needed affirmative action to get his
contracts.”186
Justice Thomas’s unique perspective can also be observed in his opinions on
redistricting and voting rights. For example, in Holder v. Hall,187 Justice Thomas
drafted a concurrence with a critical eye toward the role of race in drawing districting
lines. In Holder, the Supreme Court held that a voting dilution challenge to a
governing authority’s size under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could not
be maintained.188 Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, argued that actions
under the Voting Rights Act are restricted to eradicating practices that limit minority
access to registering to vote and voting189 and criticized what he referred to as the
“destructive assumptions” behind supporting majority-minority districts.190 Such
assumptions, Thomas maintained, only result in what can be called “racial
balkanization,”191 further the stereotype that “members of the racial group must think
alike,” and emphasize “differences between candidates and voters that are
irrelevant.”192 Justice Thomas further argued that such assumptions actually leave
minorities susceptible to more harm because they ignore not only the individuality of
each black voter but also the idea that a group of voters consisting of ten to twenty
percent of the electorate in a district can significantly influence an election, and
because they destroy any need for coalition building across racial lines.193 Moreover,
Thomas contended, the assumptions work only to create white districts in which white
representatives will not have to answer to minorities, actually diminishing minority

186.
Rosen, supra note 176, at 66.
187.
512 U.S. 874 (1994).
188.
Id. at 882–85.
189.
Id. at 893–99 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
190.
Id. at 894 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
191.
Id. at 892, 905 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We have involved the
federal courts, and indeed the Nation, in the enterprise of systematically dividing the country
into electoral districts along racial lines—an enterprise of segregating the races into political
homelands that amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of ‘political apartheid.’ Blacks
are drawn into ‘black districts’ and given ‘black representatives’; Hispanics are drawn into
Hispanic districts and given ‘Hispanic representatives’; and so on.”) (citing Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (internal citations omitted).
192.
Id. at 906 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234, 266–67 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[R]acial gerrymandering offends the
Constitution whether the motivation is malicious or benign. It is not a defense that the
legislature merely may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that blacks are reliable
Democratic voters.”). But see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and
the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1229–45 (2003)
(demonstrating through strong empirical evidence that Justice Thomas’s opinions concerning
the relationship between racial identity and politics are incorrect); Chemerinsky, supra note 54,
at 1175 (recognizing that “groups often share common interests and goals” and arguing that
“drawing election lines to create majority . . . districts recognizes that such individuals are both
individuals and members of a group, and that group identity can matter”).
193.
Holder, 512 U.S. at 900–01, 907 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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power.194 According to Justice Thomas, single-member majority-minority districts
indicate only “‘how’ members of a minority are to control seats, but not ‘how many’
seats they should be allowed to control.”195 In essence, for Thomas, such districts
dilute rather than strengthen minority voting power because they concentrate such
power in a few districts as opposed to spreading smaller but influential pockets of it
across many districts.196
While no Justices have openly discussed the influence that Justice Thomas’s
unique perspective may have had on them, his impact on the other Justices is
becoming more noticeable. In fact, such impact was most evident in Virginia v.
Black,197 a case involving a constitutional challenge to a state statute that made it a
felony “for any person . . . with the intent of intimidating any person or group . . . to
burn . . . a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.”198
During oral argument, Justice Thomas, who rarely speaks during such proceedings,199
194.
Id. at 907 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“‘Black-preferred’
candidates are assured election in ‘safe black districts’; white-preferred candidates are assured
election in ‘safe white districts.’ Neither group needs to draw on support from the other’s
constituency to win on election day. As one judge described the current trend of voting rights
cases: ‘We are bent upon polarizing political subdivisions by race. The arrangement we
construct makes it unnecessary, and probably unwise, for an elected official from a white
majority district to be responsive at all to the wishes of black citizens; similarly, it is politically
unwise for a black official from a black majority district to be responsive at all to white
citizens.’”) (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm’n, 850 F.2d 1443, 1444 (11th Cir.
1988) (Hill, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
195.
Id. at 902 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Reno v. Bossier
Parrish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 491 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Such action necessarily
decreases the level of minority influence in surrounding districts, and to that extent ‘dilutes’
the vote of minority voters in those other districts, and perhaps dilutes the influence of the
minority group as a whole.”(emphasis in original)). In his movie FAHRENHEIT 9/11, (Lions Gate
Films 2004), Michael Moore vividly displays the importance of actually having black faces in
Congress. Moore’s film begins with a scene in which several minority members of the House
of Representatives—eight black women, one Asian-American woman, and one black man—
objected to the ratification of Bush’s election to President. To have Bush’s election debated,
each objector needed a signature from just one senator. As Moore demonstrated, no senator
provided the required signature. It is worth noting that no senators at that time were black. See
id.
196.
Stephen F. Smith, The Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for Black
Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 547–48 (1999–2000) (defending Thomas’s philosophy
on minority–majority districts); see also Carol M. Swain, Not “Wrongful” by Any Means: The
Court’s Decisions in the Redistricting Cases, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (1997) (arguing
that “minorities are in a win-win situation when they are positioned to influence more
legislators than the handful they can elect when packed in oversized majority-minority
districts”).
197.
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
198.
Id. at 348; see also Brief Amici, supra note 21, at 97 (stating that “Justice
Thomas’s perspective clearly altered the consideration of the case, and brought insights that
were necessary to properly weigh the issues at stake”).
199.
See Cross Burning Case Draws Thomas’ Ire, JET MAG., Jan. 6, 2003, at 26
(describing Justice Thomas as “[n]ormally stoic and silent during arguments”); Dahlia
Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35 (noting that
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interrupted the attorney for the petitioner to express his understanding of a burning
cross as having no purpose other than to “cause fear” and “to terrorize a
population.”200 Justice Thomas’s view was that of a black man who grew up in the Jim
Crow South, with its history of lynchings and racial terrorism.201 He asserted:
Now, it’s my understanding that we had almost 100 years of lynching
and activity in the South by the Knights of Camellia and—and the Ku
Klux Klan, and this was a reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of
that reign of terror. Was—isn’t that significantly greater than
intimidation or a threat?202

As many reporters noted, the mood of the argument changed after Justice
Thomas’s dialogue with Dreeben.203 As one commentator noted, “Thomas’[s]
exasperated outburst changed the course of the debate, with several justices voicing
agreement and acknowledging that cross burning in America is a unique symbol.”204
For example, Justices O’Connor and Scalia, both of whom voted in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute, made several comments following up on Justice
Thomas’s analysis. For instance, Justice Scalia stated, “Yes. I dare say . . . [i]f you
were a black man at night, you’d rather see a man with a rifle than see a burning cross
on your front lawn. . . . The whole purpose of that is—is to terrorize.”205 Likewise,
having earlier referred to the “reasons we’ve explored this morning” (meaning
Justice’s Thomas’s statements),206 Justice O’Connor asserted, “[a]nd so the question
before us is whether burning a cross is such a terrorizing symbol in . . . American
culture that even on the basis of heightened scrutiny, it’s okay to proscribe it.”207 Even
Justice Ginsburg, who ultimately dissented from the majority and also from Justice
Thomas’s view, distinguished the cross from other symbols, declaring, “[b]ut the cross
Justice Thomas “speaks only four or fives times a year, less often than most of his colleagues
speak during an average morning”).
200.
Transcript at Oral Argument at 21, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No.
01-1107).
201.
Lithwick, supra note 199, at A35 (noting that Justice Thomas “let loose with a
personal accounting of what a burning cross means to a black man in America”).
202.
Transcript at Oral Argument at 20, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No.
01-1107).
203.
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on CrossBurning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A1 (reporting that court’s “mood appeared to have
changed” after Justice Thomas spoke).
204.
Patty Reinert, High Court Upholds Cross Burning Ban, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 8,
2003, at 01.
205.
Transcript at Oral Argument at 28, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No.
01-1107); Lithwick, supra note 199 (reporting the same). But see Guy-Uriel Charles, Colored
Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at 56 n.320, on file with Author) (“I cannot help but note that I do not know
whether other black men (or black women) would rather see a (presumably white) man on their
lawn at night with a rifle than one with a burning cross. But I do know that while this black
man would prefer neither; if I must choose, I would take the burning cross. To the extent that
the burning cross is a harbinger of things to come, the rifle is the real event.”).
206.
Transcript at Oral Argument at 29, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No.
01-1107).
207.
Id. at 34.
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is not attacking the government. It’s attacking people, threatening their lives and
limbs. . . . I think you have to separate the symbol that is the burning cross from other
symbols that are critical of government, but that don’t—that aren’t a threat to personal
safety.”208 Similarly, Justice Souter, who drafted the dissent in the case, once asked
Rodney Smolla, attorney for the respondents, “[b]ut . . . isn’t your argument an
argument that would have been sound before the cross, in effect, acquired the history
that it has? . . . How does your argument account for the fact that the cross has
acquired a potency which I would suppose is at least as equal to that of the gun?”209
In the end, the majority rejected Justice Thomas’s view that laws prohibiting
cross burning with the intent to intimidate target vicious conduct, and not speech.210
But the Court did hold, however, that the Virginia statute constitutionally limited a
form of expression that had posed an imminent threat of harm and that the statute did
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because it restricted any form of cross
burning, regardless of whom it targeted.211 Moreover, it was clear that Justice
Thomas’s speech about cross burning as part of a “reign of terror”212 had a profound
impact on Justice O’Connor’s opinion,213 with the Court, as some have argued,
rendering a decision that was at odds with its precedent214 in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul215 and with O’Connor beginning the Court’s opinion with an entire section
devoted to the historical meaning of cross burnings in the United States.216 Clearly,
Justice Thomas and his unique perspective impacted the way the other Justices
approached the case, forcing them to view the cause of action from a different angle,
even if they ultimately rejected his analysis.217 By the same token, it is likely that
other comments Justice Thomas has made during deliberations at the Court have had a
similar impact on the manner in which his colleagues have discussed and analyzed
208.
Id. at 46.
209.
Id. at 30–31.
210.
538 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his statute prohibits only conduct,
not expression. And, just as one cannot burn down someone’s house to make a political point
and then seek refuge in the First Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to
make their point.”).
211.
Id. at 363.
212.
Transcript at Oral Argument at 20, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No.
01-1107).
213.
See Paul Brest, Diversity Gives Depth to the Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at
B13 (“While most white members of the Supreme Court understand the message conveyed by
cross burning, reports of the recent oral argument in the cross-burning case suggest that the
justices were given a new perspective after listening to Justice Clarence Thomas’ passionate
description from the bench.”).
214.
See Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 29–34) (arguing that Virginia v.
Black represents a complete course reversal with respect to the Court’s approach to the
constitutionality of anti-cross burning statutes); Reinert, supra note 204, at 01 (asserting that
the “decision appeared to conflict with the high’s court’s previous rulings”).
215.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
216.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 352–59 (describing the history of the burning
cross and the Ku Klux Klan in the United States); see also Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript
at 45).
217.
See Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 41–44) (arguing how the epistemic
authority that Justice Thomas held as black man who could uniquely feel the harms of cross
burning framed the disposition of Virginia v. Black).
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other cases, thereby enhancing the judicial process218 and again boosting one of the
primary goals of forward-looking affirmative action.219
B. Voices Within
In addition to buttressing pro-affirmative action arguments concerning the
benefits of interracial diversity of perspective among judges, Justice Thomas’s seat
and performance on the Court also support pro-affirmative action claims regarding
gains from non-minorities’ exposure to intraracial diversity of perspective.
Specifically, Justice Thomas’s presence and conservative political views shatter any
stereotypes about the existence of a monolithic minority viewpoint220 and perceptions
that minority judges are automatically biased against white litigants, a view that has
led to many unfounded requests for recusal of black judges.221
Indeed, it is no secret that Justice Thomas’s views on many issues that
concern race are widely disparate from those of many Blacks, most notably the late
Justice Marshall.222 For the Justices who served on the bench during Justice
Marshall’s tenure and who now serve on the bench with Justice Thomas, the
difference between the only two racial minorities to sit on the Supreme Court must be
striking.
If nothing else, Justice Thomas surely destroys the myth that there is only
one “black voice” and that all Blacks think alike and stick together.223 Indeed, whereas
Justice Thomas, the second black justice on the Court, vehemently opposes
218.
See supra Part II.A & notes 133–36.
219.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
220.
See Chen, supra note 78, at 135 (noting that diversity in general helps to “dispel
traditional stereotypes that Asian Pacific Americans and other minorities are not sufficiently
intelligent, articulate, or decisive to be judges”); Edwards, supra note 97, at 327–28 (stating
that “there is no overriding ‘black perspective’ on which black judges rely in their decision
making”).
221.
In the past, litigants have challenged the impartiality of minority judges where
discrimination was at issue, a burden that black judges continue to face. See, e.g., Blank v.
Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2–4, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (involving a request for recusal
of Judge Constance Baker Motley in a gender discrimination case against a law firm and the
judge’s response that “if background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient
grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear the case, or many others, by virtue of
the fact that all of them [are] attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public
service backgrounds”); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155, 165–79 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (concerning the request for a recusal of Judge Leon Higginbotham in a union
discrimination case, where the judge declared that there was no conflict between impartiality
and being black and expressing solidarity with one’s community).
222.
See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 9–12, 47–48, 50)
(“Although both are African American, Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas approach the
law from dramatically different perspectives and could be expected to reach different
conclusions in the same cases.”).
223.
See Edwards, supra note 97, at 327 (asserting that the range of political and
ideological positions among black lawyers is staggering); Ifill, supra note 15, at 421 (noting
that “[t]he black community has never been monolithic in its view of how best to advance its
collective economic, political, and social interests”).
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affirmative action, Justice Marshall, the first black justice, was its champion.224 For
example, in his dissent in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,225 a case in which the
Court struck down a construction set-aside program benefiting minorities,226 Justice
Marshall indicated that the Court’s decision “mark[ed] a deliberate and giant step
backward in the Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence.”227 Unlike Justice Thomas,
who has asserted that there can be no distinctions “between laws designed to
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race,”228 Justice
Marshall argued the exact opposite in Croson, stating that “[a] profound difference
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental actions
that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental
activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.”229 While some may find Justice
Thomas’s opinions to be personally distasteful, there is no arguing that his presence
makes clear that no one black person can enlighten others as to what all Blacks may
think.230
In fact, the divergence between Justice Thomas’s and Justice Marshall’s
views—and in many respects, the views of the vast majority of Blacks231—is not
limited to affirmative action alone.232 Perhaps the two black Justices’ most notable

224.
See Why Clarence Thomas Doesn’t Deserve a Black Forum: NO PLACE AT
THE TABLE, EMERGE, Sept. 1998, at 58 (“Justice Marshall believed that affirmative action was
helpful to minorities and women, while Justice Thomas views it as a cancer to be eradicated.”).
225.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
226.
Id. at 498–510. The Court held that the City had failed to show its past
discrimination against the minority beneficiaries of the program and had not narrowly tailored
its program to remedy the past effects of discrimination. Id.
227.
Id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228.
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
229.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 551–52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230.
See Emily Calhoun, An Essay on the Professorial Responsibility of Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002) (discussing the
burdens on “token” minority students in classrooms and detailing the pressures of being
expected to represent one’s race).
231.
See, e.g., Poll: Public Split on Affirmative Action, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7,
2003 (stating that eighty-nine percent of Blacks still think affirmative action programs are
necessary).
232.
One commentator has described what he viewed as a striking difference between
the two Justices in a 1996 case that Thomas has referred to as his favorite, Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Hiles, 516 U.S. 400 (1996). That case involved Williams Hiles, a switchman, who
sought to recover damages for injuries he sustained while adjusting a misaligned drawbar
between two cars. Id. Hiles’s actions, referred to as coupling, “accounted for 11 of the 76
deaths among railroad workers during a recent six-year period.” Tony Mauro, Decade After
Confirmation, Thomas Becoming a Force on High Court, FULTON CTY. DAILY REP., Aug. 20,
2001, at 1. In ruling on Hiles’s claim, the Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice
Thomas, held that the railroad was not liable under the Safety Appliance Act for the injuries
Hiles sustained while straightening a misaligned drawbar, a decision which made it harder for
railroad workers, many of whom are Black, to recover damages for such accidents. As the
commentator noted about Justice Thomas’s decision and how it would likely differ from one of
Justice Marshall, “‘Justice Thomas is proud of a decision that makes the railroad workplace
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differences are exhibited in their opinions on crime-related matters.233 While
Thurgood Marshall’s opinions are known for the manner in which they maintained a
regard for the rights of prisoners and for criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial,234
Justice Thomas’s criminal jurisprudence has earned him nicknames such as “[t]he
youngest, cruelest justice”235 and “Clarence the Cruel.”236 Thomas first earned this
reputation as the “cruelest justice” when he issued a dissent in Hudson v.
McMillian,237 where he argued that an inmate’s beating by two prison guards, which
bruised the inmate’s face, loosened his teeth, blackened his eye, burst his lip, and
cracked his dental plate, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause238—a vote that all agree Justice Marshall never would have cast.239
Additionally, unlike Justice Marshall, who asserted in his concurrence in Batson v.
Kentucky240 that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury
less safe. Not to inject race into it, but Thurgood Marshall would have known the consequences
of the decision to African-Americans in a heartbeat.’” Id. (emphasis added).
233.
Justice Thomas’s criminal law jurisprudence holds true to his philosophy that “a
criminal justice system is to hold people accountable for the consequences of their actions.”
Hon. Clarence Thomas, Keynote Address, 1 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 271–76 (1996)
(discussing how he perceives the criminal justice system should be affected by the ideal of
personal responsibility).
234.
See generally Melvin Gutterman, The Prison Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood
Marshall, 56 MD. L. REV. 149 (1997) (discussing Justice Marshall’s prison jurisprudence and
how such jurisprudence reflected his passion for prison reform).
235.
Editorial, The Youngest, Cruelest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24.
236.
Derrick Z. Jackson, Thomas’s Cruel View of Prisoners, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28,
2003, at A19; see, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993) (arguing that the
Court should overrule Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which established that “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment). Cf.
Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging Visions of
Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 599–610 (1995) (discussing Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence on Eighth Amendment, death penalty, and habeas corpus cases).
237.
503 U.S. 1 (1992).
238.
Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Professor Stephen Smith of the University of
Virginia School of Law has made clear that Justice Thomas did not argue “that beating
prisoners is acceptable conduct that is permitted by the Constitution.” See Smith, supra note
196, at 539. As Professor Smith highlighted the following:
Importantly, in concluding that the Eighth Amendment afforded no basis
for relief, Justice Thomas emphasized that “if available state remedies were
not constitutionally adequate, [the prisoner] would have a claim [for relief]
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and stated
that he “agree [d]” that the Due Process Clause “is the appropriate, and
appropriately limited, federal constitutional inquiry in this case.”
Id. at 540.
239.
See Hon. Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas: A
Glance at Their Philosophies, 73 MICH. B.J. 298, 300–01 (1994) (asserting that the two Justices
had strong differences in opinion on the rights of an individual under the Eighth Amendment).
Cf. Note, Lasting Stigma: Affirmative Action and Clarence Thomas’s Prisoners’ Rights
Jurisprudence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1341–47 (1999) (concluding that Justice Thomas’s
conservative jurisprudence is in part due to his attempts to distinguish himself from Justice
Marshall).
240.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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selection is so inescapable that peremptories should be banned entirely,241 Justice
Thomas argued in a dissent in Miller-El v. Cockrell242 that the petitioner had failed to
demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether he provided clear and
convincing evidence to prove racial discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges.243 Justice Thomas made this argument in the face of the majority’s
determination that the petitioner had proved the plausibility of his underlying
constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) by producing historical evidence of
a memorandum that ordered attorneys in Dallas District Attorney’s Office not to allow
Blacks and Mexican-Americans on the jury244 and evidence showing that ninety-one
percent of eligible black jurors were excluded245 from the petitioner’s venire.246
In all, the distinctions between Justice Marshall’s and Justice Thomas’s
judicial careers, and between Justice Thomas’s political views and those of many
241.
Id. at 102–08 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Merely allowing defendants the
opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual
cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge. . . . Even if all parties
approach the Court’s mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them
to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels—a challenge I doubt all of them can
meet.”).
242.
537 U.S. 322 (2003).
243.
Id. at 354–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244.
The 1963 circular read, “Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a
member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well educated.” Id. at 334–
35, 346–47 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 104
(Marshall, J., concurring) (ironically citing to the instruction book in the same Dallas County at
issue in Miller-El, which advised prosecutors to conduct jury selection so as to “eliminate ‘any
member of a minority group’”).
245.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 331, 342 (“Of the 11 African-American jurors remaining
[after removals for cause], . . . all but 1 were excluded by peremptory strikes exercised by the
prosecutors. . . . In contrast the prosecutors used their peremptory strikes against just 13% (4
out of 31) of the eligible nonblack prospective jurors qualified to serve on petitioner’s jury. . . .
In total, 10 of the prosecutors’ 14 peremptory strikes were used against African-Americans.”).
246.
Other evidence presented included the fact that three of the State’s proffered
race-neutral rationales for striking African Americans—“ambivalence about the death penalty;
hesitancy to vote to execute defendants capable of being rehabilitated, and the jurors’ own
family history of criminality”—pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not
challenged and who did serve on the jury and that fact the State used racially disparate
questioning. Id. at 343; see, e.g., id. at 332, 344–45 (“Most African-Americans (53% percent,
or 8 out of 15) were first given a detailed description of the mechanics of an execution in
Texas. . . . Only then were these African-American venire members asked whether they could
render a decision leading to a sentence of death. Very few prospective white jurors (6%, or 3
out of 49) were given this preface prior to being asked for their views on capital punishment.”).
One more convincing piece of evidence was proof that state courts failed to consider the
evidence of the prosecution’s use of the jury shuffle. See id. at 334–35, 346 (“This practice
permits parties to rearrange the order in which members of the venire are examined so as to
increase the likelihood that visually preferable venire members will be moved forward and
empanelled. . . . On at least two occasions the prosecution requested shuffles when there were a
predominant number of African-Americans in the front of the panel.”); see also Michael M.
Gallagher, Abolishing the Texas Jury Shuffle, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 303, 312–19 (2004) (arguing
that the jury shuffle has outlived its usefulness and that Texas should join the forty-nine other
states that disallow its use).
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members of the black community, advance the goal of affirmative action by breaking
down stereotypes about the lack of diversity in minority perspectives.247 They
highlight differences among Blacks in both their experiences and views in a way that
can enhance the learning process both in schools and in jobs.248 For example, as
Professors Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige once acknowledged, the inclusion of even
affluent Blacks in affirmative action programs can be as beneficial as the participation
of poor Blacks,249 as “the experiences of growing up . . . as an affluent African
American in the United States are nonetheless quite different from growing up white”
or from growing up black and poor.250
In sum, although the benefits of including Justice Thomas’s “raced”
jurisprudence are highly debatable in light of the fact that his views could potentially
result in a greater number of decisions that most Blacks view as harmful,251 there is a
benefit to Justice Thomas’s standing as a symbol to the general public of the array of
viewpoints among Blacks and other minorities in the United States.252 His presence
alone helps to destroy the idea that all Blacks think and act alike. Destroying the
perception of uniformity in views among Blacks is positive in the sense that it not
only breaks down stereotypes but also opens the door for discussions about differing
viewpoints within the black community.253 As Nobel Prize-winning novelist Toni
Morrison explained about Thomas’s confirmation (even though she was not one of his
supporters), “something positive and liberating has surfaced” because the clear
exposure of differences of thought among black people made it possible, if not
necessary, to speak about race matters without “the barriers, the silences, the
embarrassing gaps in discourse.”254 Indeed, Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme
Court reinitiated an awareness of the range of black political thought, an awareness
247.
See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 6, 34–
37 (1991) (discussing the need for a focus on genuine diversity that does not deny black
individuality); WILLIAMS, supra note 115, at 103, 121 (same).
248.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 876.
249.
Id. To my mind, however, if choosing between a poor black applicant and a
wealthy black applicant of similar qualifications (however broadly that is defined), one should
select the poor black applicant, whose successes at that point may indicate a will to succeed
that is valuable in any school or job; cf. Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig, Note, Moving Ground,
Breaking Traditions: Tasha’s Chronicle, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 255, 272–73 (1997) (arguing
that a person who came from an economically disadvantaged background or overcame many
obstacles just to obtain an education could become a particularly tenacious lawyer).
250.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 876.
251.
See discussion infra Conclusion.
252.
See Carol M. Swain, Double Standard, Double Bind: African-American
Leadership After the Thomas Debacle, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 215, 228–29
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (citing the revelation of a diversity of black opinion as a positive,
but describing how she ultimately came to oppose Thomas’s nomination because of his
willingness to cry “race, race, race” when the pressure was on).
253.
In this section, I do not mean to suggest that the benefit that stems from
exposure to interracial diversity of viewpoint outweighs any negatives that come from the
results of Justice Thomas’s votes on the Court. See infra Conclusion.
254.
See Toni Morrison, Introduction: Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-ING JUSTICE,
EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SOCIAL REALITY vii–xxx (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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that had been absent from the media since the disputes between civil rights activists
who preached non-violence and black nationalists, such as the Black Panthers, who
sought freedom, justice, and equality by any means necessary. By doing so, it may
make it more possible for Blacks, as Professor Richard Delgado has argued, to
reconfigure strategies on civil rights issues that “take account of a complex
fragmented racial reality in which [different groups of Blacks] have differing goals
and needs.”255
C. Working the Right Way
Finally, Justice Thomas himself makes the case for affirmative action
because he exposes the weaknesses of traditional standards of merit, both through his
performance on the Court and, ironically enough, through his own opinions,
specifically his dissent in Grutter. In so doing, he adds legitimacy to the demand for a
re-parameterization of merit standards. For example, although Clarence Thomas
arguably had not achieved similar distinction in his schooling and his career as his
fellow Justices at the time of his appointment,256 he, as several scholars have
maintained, has performed on a level equal to his peers—establishing his own voice
and philosophies on the way.257 Indeed, in a prior article, I respond to criticisms that
Justice Thomas is a “Scalia clone” by demonstrating how Justice Thomas, through his
jurisprudence, does not follow Justice Scalia but instead participates in America’s
long history of black conservative thought.258 Moreover, as the years have passed, the
quiet Thomas has developed respect among and gained serious attention from
numerous scholars.259 For example, Professor Scott Gerber has dedicated a significant
part of his career to studying Justice Thomas and praises the Justice for his fiercely
independent voice and adherence to individualistic color-blind constitutionalism.260
Likewise, others have applauded the Justice for his defense of the First
Amendment.261 Even liberals, such as Professors Guy-Uriel Charles and Mark
Tushnet (and even myself), have warned that scholars should pay particular attention
to the ways in which Justice Thomas’s voice is “raced” and that Justice Thomas
255.
Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing
About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (1991) (book review).
256.
See discussion supra Introduction.
257.
See Scott D. Gerber, Sen. Reid v. Justice Thomas, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004,
at A13; Mauro, supra note 232, at 1 (asserting that Justices Thomas and Scalia have different
approaches to originalism); see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84)
(contrasting Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence with Justice Scalia’s).
258.
See generally Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–84).
259.
See Mauro, supra note 232, at 1 (asserting that Justice Thomas “has defined a
deep, clearly personal jurisprudence anchored in originalism that is receiving some scholarly
respect”).
260.
See generally GERBER, supra note 10; Gerber, supra note 11, at 63.
261.
See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, Jurist Embraces Image as a
Hard-Line Holdout, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A1(asserting that “Thomas has been one of
the amendment’s staunchest defenders on the court”); David L. Hudson, Justice Clarence
Thomas: The Emergence of Commercial-Speech Protector, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 485, 486–87
(2002) (claiming that Justice Thomas is a more forceful advocate for commercial speech than
his predecessor Justice Marshall).
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himself is a force to be reckoned with.262 For example, Thomas has been described
“‘as a right-wing intellectual force in his own right, a radical conservative capable of
spinning out bold, well-researched legal essays in clear, provocative prose.’”263
Indeed, the young black Justice may become the Supreme Court’s next Chief Justice,
which would also make him the first black Chief Justice.264
Most of all, Thomas’s appointment to the Court itself tested traditional
notions of “qualifications” to serve on the Court. In defending Thomas’s nomination
to the Court, Thomas’s advocates highlighted various forms of “non-traditional”
criteria, in particular his life experiences and unique perspective based on those
experiences, as important contributions to the Court.265 In so doing, Thomas’s largely
Republican supporters ironically conceded the ways in which traditional definitions of
merit can be non-neutral and arbitrarily serve to exclude people of color. In essence,
by declaring that Thomas was the “best man for the job,”266 his supporters admitted,
even if only for political reasons, that traditional notions of merits can and should be
re-parameterized.
More importantly, the language in Justice Thomas’s opinions uncovers the
way in which affirmative action can challenge strict adherence to traditional standards
of merit. In fact, Justice Thomas challenged reliance on such standards in his dissent
in Grutter.267 For example, he acknowledged the inadequacy of traditional merit
standards, stating:
262.
See Scott D. Gerber, “My Rookie Years Are Over”: Clarence Thomas After Ten
Years, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 343, 348 (2002) (reporting that “[s]ome liberals
are now willing to admit that [Justice Thomas] has many interesting things to say”); see, e.g.,
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 1 (manuscript at 75–81); Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at
34–39); Tushnet, supra note 24, at 339. But see Fletcher & Merida, supra note 261(arguing that
Justice Thomas is not a persuasive force on the court because his “unbending approach makes
it difficult to assign him opinions in closely contested cases for fear that he might not be able to
hold a majority”).
263.
GERBER supra note 10, at 25.
264.
See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS
4 (2004). Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid recently asserted his opposition to Justice
Thomas being appointed Chief Justice. In so doing, Senator Reid declared that Justice Thomas
is an “embarrassment” to the Court while proclaiming that Justice Scalia is suitable for the
position because he “is one smart guy.” Zev Chafets, Editorial, Slap at Thomas Stinks of
Racism, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 2004, at 43; Michael A. Fletcher, Reid Says He Could Back
Scalia for Chief Justice; Comments Anger Liberals and Thomas Supporters, WASH. POST, Dec.
7, 2004, at A04. Some commentators have highlighted how the Senator’s strikingly different
opinions of the two conservative justices may be influenced by the stereotype of black
incompetence. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Clarence Thomas as Chief Justice?, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 2, 2005, at 9.
265.
See Murray, supra note 43, at 374–85 (describing how the debate regarding
Thomas’s appointment expanded the criteria that was reviewed in the vote on his nomination to
the Court).
266.
See GREENYA, supra note 6, at 171 (stating that President Bush was supposed to
refer to Judge Thomas as the “best man” for the job instead of the “best qualified”); Wells,
supra note 20, at 121.
267.
Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1629–30
(2003) (noting that Justice Thomas knows the admissions process is not based on merit).
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[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other
measures to “predict” academic performance is a poor substitute for a
system that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in
the study of law. The rallying cry that in the absence of racial
discrimination in admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores
the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to
“merit.”268

After pointing out that the practice of legacy admissions flies in the face of
true merit, Justice Thomas identified what he viewed as the real problem: the
University of Michigan’s refusal to abandon its use of the LSAT,269 a test that is
known to produce racially disproportionate results.270 Justice Thomas then expressed
his belief that the law school was not “looking for those students, who despite a lower
LSAT score or undergraduate grade point average, will succeed in the study of law,”
but rather was only trying to create a class that looked right.271 In all, Justice Thomas
called for the Court to require the elite institution to re-evaluate its admissions
process.272 Although at times Justice Thomas’s words indicate an acceptance of sorts
of the use of standardized tests such as the LSAT,273 supporters of affirmative action
should accept the Justice’s call for a re-parameterization of the school’s standards as a
welcome plea for forcing a change in the way merit is defined in general.

CONCLUSION
For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.
—Audre Lorde274

As demonstrated above, Justice Thomas, in a sense, makes the case for
affirmative action. His unique and, in many ways, “raced” perspective on legal issues
highlights the benefits of including a broad range of voices in our schools,

268.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367–78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
269.
Id. at 369–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then attempt to ‘correct’ for black
underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic
student body.”).
270.
See William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Educational Attainment? A Study of Equally Achieving ‘Elite’ College Students,
89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1073–85 (2001) (concluding that the LSAT systematically
disadvantages minority law school applicants).
271.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
272.
Id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
“before being given license to use racial discrimination, the Law School [should] be required to
radically reshape its admissions process”).
273.
See id. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (implicitly
asserting that the LSAT is a valid measure of success in law school when he stated that the law
school admitted unprepared students who find themselves overmatched in the law school and
outperformed by their white peers).
274.
LORDE, supra note 1, at 112.
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workplaces, and even in our courts.275 His dissenting voice from many individuals in
the black community on numerous subjects helps to expose the diversity of viewpoints
within the black community, revealing that there is no one black voice.276 His
performance on the Court and his own words lay a strong foundation for criticizing an
adherence to traditional merit standards that have worked to exclude many minority
groups from schools and jobs.277 Even his life experiences as someone who overcame
extreme poverty and racial stereotyping, both before and after school, stand as an
example of the systematic social disparity that affirmative action was in part created to
address.278
But can the master’s tool really dismantle his house? The answer is rather
complex. As the late Audre Lorde, renowned feminist and activist, once declared,
“[The master’s tools] may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they
will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”279
On the one hand, Lorde’s words are fitting because, although Justice Thomas
can serve as a good argument for affirmative action in numerous contexts, in other
ways, he fails to make the case, particularly within the context of judicial selections.
For example, while Justice Thomas brings to the Court a special perspective based on
his experiences as a black man who endured the segregated South, his voice does not
introduce the traditionally excluded perspectives of the vast majority of Blacks,280 one
of the often-cited benefits of diversity on the bench.281 In this sense, Justice Thomas’s
275.
See Brief Amici, supra note 21, at 98 (“Such consideration of the race of a
judicial nominee has been beneficial to the Court, not because Justice Thomas has the same
world view or shares the same judicial orientation as had Justice Marshall. Rather, it is because
each of them, in his own way, brought or brings to the Court’s adjudication an awareness and
perspective that is based in part on their experiences as African American individuals.”
(emphasis added)).
276.
See Sunder, supra note 104, at 497 n.6 (stating that Thomas has been subject to
“intimidation” used against him for expressing conservative views unpopular with many black
Americans).
277.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 186 (noting that Thomas described the University
of Michigan Law School’s actions in “exceptionalizing diversity and disconnecting it from
genuine merit [as] problematic”).
278.
See discussion supra Introduction & notes 34–40.
279.
LORDE, supra note 1, at 112.
280.
See Michael deHaven Newsom, Clarence Thomas, Victim? Perhaps, and
Victimizer? Yes—A Study in Social and Racial Alienation from African-Americans, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 327, 418 (2004) (noting that Justice Thomas’s presence on the Court does not
allow for a claim “that black people have a representative on the Court, that is to say, a person
with whom they feel any real sense of community”); see also Ifill, supra note 15, at 415
(arguing that “[m]inority judicial candidates who are explicitly promoted to fulfill diversity
objectives . . . must offer more than their racial ‘face’ to demonstrate that they can bring
diversity to the bench”); cf. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 46–50)
(describing how the appointment of a Latino judge, such as Miguel Estrada, may add to
diversity and the perception of judicial impartiality but would not further the inclusion of
perspectives traditionally absent from the judiciary).
281.
See WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 174. As Judge Henry Bramwell of the
Eastern District of New York, a black conservative, once stated, “[B]lack judges can articulate
the problems of the black community. Black federal judges are also needed to combat the
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presence on the Court arguably accomplishes little in increasing most of the black
community’s faith in the judicial system and judicial decision-making and certainly
does less in “representing” the perspective of many Blacks.282 For Blacks who find
themselves disproportionately entangled in the judicial system283 and in other
instances dependent on the judicial system’s role in recognizing their basic rights,284
this form of representation is critical.285
To say that the vast majority of Blacks now hold no more confidence in
Justice Thomas’s likelihood of “representing” their views than in some of his white
colleagues is not an exaggeration.286 Unlike Justice Marshall, who pushed his
colleagues “to reconcile legal norms with outsider realities,”287 one could argue that
Justice Thomas does not truly bring an outsider viewpoint or alternative, but solely a
different (although important) bent on an insider view.288 In fact, many Blacks would
prejudice, discrimination, and racism that is deeply rooted in our society.” Id. Judge Bramwell
was the one black judge to contest the Judge Higginbotham’s criticisms of Thomas. See id. at
175.
282.
See Johnson, supra note 157, at 5 (acknowledging that “Justice Marshall gave
voice to the sentiments of many African Americans”).
283.
See CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL
193–94 (1996) (noting that Blacks comprise 50.8 percent of the inmates in our prisons and jails
and that Blacks are incarcerated at a rate of 1,947 per 100,000 black citizens compared to a rate
of 306 per 100,000 for white citizens); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A
Comment on Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction”, 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2553–67 (1995)
(detailing how the criminal justice system is biased both racially and socioeconomically).
284.
See Biskupic, supra note 172 (noting that Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law
School has described the Supreme Court as “the ultimate place that black people had been able
to go to to vindicate their rights”).
285.
See Chen, supra note 78, at 135 (“How can the public have confidence and trust
in such an institution if it is segregated―if the communities it is supposed to protect are
excluded from its ranks? A diverse judiciary signals the public acknowledgment of historically
excluded communities and sends an invaluable message of inclusion. It enhances courts’
credibility among affected communities who would otherwise feel they have no voice within
the institution.” (emphasis added)). This is not to suggest that a Supreme Court Justice serves
as a representative for any group of people, only to say that such representation of views is one
of the cited benefits of diversity on the bench.
286.
Cf. John O. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged
Blacks—From Clarence Thomas to “The Law School Five”, 46 HOW. L.J. 175, 180 (2003)
(“[Justice Thomas’s] complicated identity as an African American is challenged constantly.
Within significant segments of black America, he has been written off. For instance, over the
last six years, Ebony Magazine has refused to list Justice Thomas among its 100 most
influential African Americans.”).
287.
Ifill, supra note 15, at 456–57, 484 (stating that Justice Marshall “forced the
other Justices to confront and address the reality of life for the poor, for women, for African
Americans, and for other marginalized groups”).
288.
Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1303 (2002)
(maintaining that Justice Thomas’s racial and conservative jurisprudence/politics entrenches a
social arrangement that advantages Whites and disadvantages Blacks in access to social
resources—education, employment, and housing). Justice Thomas has, however, indicated
sensitivity to having the law be accessible to people of all socioeconomic classes and education
levels by expressing his desire to write opinions that persons without a college education can
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rather leave the fate of civil rights in the hands of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
or Stevens.289 Moreover, as the late Judge Leon Higginbotham once argued, as a
minority, Justice Thomas’s support of what are perceived as “insider views” on racial
issues may give “an imprimatur of satisfaction and approval” to such positions.290 In
this sense, Justice Thomas’s “voice of color” actually presents a danger to the interests
of many Blacks because his race, in some instances, may lend credibility to his
positions291 and thus wrongly signify to others that he is representing the interests of
people whose views are actually in direct opposition to his own.292
Furthermore, while in some respect Justice Thomas serves as an important
role model for all people293 (especially given his strong commitment to mentoring and
speaking before groups of underprivileged black children), in other ways his utility as
a role model for minority children and young adults may be inadequate.294 As many
proponents of affirmative action have argued, an important aim of affirmative action is
the manner in which it helps to remove limitations that minorities may place on career
aspirations due to lack of representation in any given field.295 Thus, unlike a racially
diverse student body that may enhance public “confidence in the openness and
integrity of educational institutions” simply because of the range of diverse
perspectives among students,296 Justice Thomas’s inclusion on the Court does not
necessarily advance the benefit of role modeling or a feeling of inclusion for many
understand. See Michael A. Fletcher & Kevin Merida, Calling the Reputable, Reliable, RightLeaning, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A11.
289.
Cf. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 105 (manuscript at 51) (“Many,
perhaps most, [minorities] . . . would rather have nine [Justice] William Brennans on the
Supreme Court than nine Clarence Thomases.”).
290.
WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 5.
291.
See, e.g., Charles, supra note 205 (manuscript at 41–44) (arguing how that
Justice Thomas held epistemic authority as black man who could uniquely feel the harms of
cross burning in Virginia v. Black).
292.
See WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 5; Carbado, supra note 288, at 1303–05.
293.
See WASHINGTON, supra note 130, at 36 (describing the personal experience of
Judge Veronica MacBeth, a black female judge in California, who stated that “everybody looks
up to” judges).
294.
See Merida & Fletcher, supra note 1 (stating that Robert Brooks, a Savannah
radio talk show host who boarded buses from Savannah to Washington, D.C., in support of
Thomas’s nomination, felt betrayed by Thomas’s record and declared that he did not want
Thomas “held up as a role model”). But see Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a
Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222,
1226–28 (1991) (describing the problems with the role model argument for affirmative action).
295.
See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1620 (2003) (describing how affirmative action can offer “hope to young
African-Americans that they can escape the ghetto”); Stroud, supra note 2, at 386–92 (arguing
that affirmative action can “expand people’s sense of what is possible for them, so that they can
subject the full range of options to the kind of individualized scrutiny that is appropriate to
career decisions and goals”); see also Edwards, supra note 97, at 329 (asserting that the strong
presence of black judges serves as an inspiration for minorities who aspire to positions in the
legal profession); Chen, supra note 78, at 135 (explaining that a diverse judiciary “assures
students and young lawyers from historically underrepresented communities that they need not
limit their aspirations”).
296.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).

2005]

JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS

159

minorities.297 As many scholars have noted, young individuals from socially
disadvantaged groups are more likely to have low career aspirations because they do
not often see people who look like them and share their background in positions of
high achievement.298 Thus, to the extent that affirmative action assists members of
certain racial minorities in achieving visible success, it helps to encourage younger
members of similar groups to strive for success and to convince them that such
success is attainable.299 However, if the most effective role models are those whom
children and young adults see as being like them,300 then Justice Thomas does not fit
the script, because he is viewed by so many Blacks as a traitor to his race301 (although
perhaps wrongfully).302 In fact, young Blacks with divergent views may wonder, “Do
I have to think like him to succeed at a similar level? Will I be allowed to advance,
when deserving, if I do not ‘sell out’ my people?”303
Finally, Clarence Thomas does not make the case for affirmative action
because of his beliefs regarding how affirmative action stigmatizes minorities.304 For
Clarence Thomas, who asserts that he did not benefit from the policy,305 the stigma
that affirmative action “places on” minorities, especially people who would have
achieved on their own “merit,” nullifies any benefit that may be gained by greater
minority or female presence in schools or the workplace.306 To him, the policy renders
all minorities as second-rate and inferior in the eyes of the majority and only works to
297.
See Ifill, supra note 15, at 482 (“While Thomas’s backers viewed him as a black
role model, to many blacks, Thomas was not a role model.”).
298.
See, e.g., Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 869 (stating that young members of
an intractably disadvantaged group often come to believe that “regardless of their efforts, group
members simply cannot succeed”).
299.
Id. (describing the importance of same-race role models). Cf. Stroud, supra note
2, at 386–92 (same).
300.
Brest & Oshige, supra note 81, at 875 (describing differing perceptions of racial
and ethnic identity between two brothers of mixed Irish and Salvadoran heritage—one of them
being Professor Ian Haney Lopez—and noting how hiring Professor Lopez, who holds a panLatino identity, may benefit members of other Latino groups but hiring his brother who relates
most easily with his Anglo side would not serve any of the goals of affirmative action).
301.
See Smith, supra note 196, at 513, 529–30 (noting that Thomas has been called
a “traitor” and that “some of his harshest attacks have come from the civil rights community”).
302.
See Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, LatCrit IX Symposium, Defining Ourselves for
Ourselves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (exploring definitions of blackness and
describing how the use of terms such as “sellout” and “IncogNegro” are damaging to Blacks).
303.
Cf. JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB: A
STUDY OF ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT 160 (2003) (defining “role model [as] somebody a
person wants to be like” (emphasis in original).
304.
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
305.
See Classic Example, supra note 6, at 35.
306.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Beyond the harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon
its test subjects, no social science has disproved the notion that this discrimination ‘engenders
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that
they have been wronged by the government’s use of race.’”) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at
241). See generally CARTER, supra note 247, at 4–5, 11, 47–67 (describing the harmful
emotional effects of affirmative action on himself).
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perpetuate the myth of minority incompetence.307 Indeed, portions of Justice Thomas’s
dissent in Grutter almost seemed personal,308 including his complaint that “[w]hen
blacks take positions in the highest place of government, industry, or academia, it is
an open question today whether their skin color played a part in their
advancement.”309 Affirmative action supporters, however, contend that any negatives,
including stigma, are outweighed by the benefits of the policy.310 Mainly, though, they
have highlighted the fact that the stigma of racial inferiority was not caused by
affirmative action, but instead has always existed in American society.311 After all, the
stigma existed when Blacks were deemed to be three-fifths of a person solely for
purposes of representation.312 It existed when Justice Harlan, who has been praised by
many for his lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,313 essentially proclaimed the
superiority of Whites by saying, “The white race deems itself to be the dominant race
in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and
307.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Who can differentiate between those who belong and those who do not? The majority of
blacks are admitted to the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this policy all
are tarred as undeserving. This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to
whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of racial discrimination. . . . The
question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case
the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did not, in which case asking the
question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.”).
308.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 181 (guessing that Justice Thomas perhaps had a
“personal axe to grind” in Grutter); see also Tushnet, supra note 24, at 338 (“One would have
to have a completely tin ear not to hear the reference to high places in government as
identifying Justice Thomas himself.”).
309.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373; see also Kearney, supra note 180, at 33.
310.
See Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of
Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 881 (1997) (“Furthermore,
any stigma-attached downside to affirmative action does not outweigh the upside of providing
opportunities for women of color that would not otherwise exist.”); see also F. Michael
Higginbotham, Affirmative Action in the United States and South Africa: Lessons From the
Other Side, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 187, 209–210 (1999) (arguing that the positives of
affirmative action outweigh its burdens). See generally Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative
Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697 (1999).
311.
See Padilla, supra note 310, at 880 (“Blacks and whites must face the fact that
affirmative action has made no significant difference in the way whites look at blacks.
Competent and successful blacks are still seen as exceptional. Before and since affirmative
action, most white people see another white as competent until proven incompetent and a black
person as incompetent until proved competent.” (emphasis added)); Patterson, supra note 21, at
334 (same). See also Guinier, supra note 84, at 186 (asserting that “[e]rroneous assumptions
about black intellectual inferiority, laziness, and general undeservedness have a long history”).
312.
See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of
the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 428 (1999) (“The three fifths clause
provided for counting three-fifths of all slaves for purposes of representation in Congress.”).
313.
163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths white and
one-eighth black, filed a lawsuit, seeking the rights, privileges, and immunity of Whites, after
he was thrown out of a white railroad passenger car based on race. Id. at 541–42. The Supreme
Court held that state-mandated racial segregation in railroad passenger cars did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as the separate facilities were
equal. See id. at 544, 550–51.
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in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time.”314 It existed during the
Jim Crow era,315 and it continues to exist today.316 Supporters further contend that
such stigma, which is caused by racism,317 is not likely to disappear unless interaction
across racial lines occurs on a regular basis, with individuals of all races coming to
learn about and appreciate each other as equals.318 In sum, what is stigmatizing for
most minorities is not affirmative action,319 but rather beliefs that are rooted in the
idea of white superiority. Indeed, as one civil rights activist who attended Boalt Hall
Law under an affirmative action program declared, “‘Stigmatize [us], give [us] that
degree.’ [It’s not] [a]s though if you don’t have the Berkeley degree you’re not
stigmatized as a black person.”320
While Lorde’s words about the inability of the master’s tool to dismantle his
house are fitting in the sense that Justice Thomas does not advance certain important
benefits of affirmative action, her words are not fitting when applied to selected
portions of Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, which can serve as a catalyst for
instituting true change in society, in particular the admissions processes at schools.
Just as the words of many liberals have been co-opted by conservatives, including
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s hope that his children would one day be “judged by the
content of their character rather than the color of their skin,”321 supporters of
314.
Id. at 559.
315.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting that racial
segregation is “usually interpreted as denoting inferiority of the [N]egro group” (internal
quotations omitted)).
316.
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect”, 56
OKLA. L. REV. 833, 858–59 (2003) (describing how “[p]rejudicial social norms are too
pervasive and strong for anyone to avoid without effort”).
317.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 186–87, 190 (describing how racism is linked to
stigma and helps to explain “why legacy preferences, which account for a larger percentage of
admissions at selective colleges than do racial or ethnic factors, do not generate the same
‘stigma’”). Cf. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 107, at 995 & n.183 (stating that legacies account
for up to twenty-five percent of admissions to top schools).
318.
See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 35–36, on file with the Author)
(asserting that true racial equality can be achieved only through integration that allows persons
to recognize their shared experiences and interests).
319.
See F. Michael Higginbotham, supra note 310, at 210 (“In the United States,
few recipients of affirmative action perceive it as stigmatizing.”).
320.
Patterson, supra note 21, at 334.
321.
Many conservatives cite this language when they argue for colorblind policies.
However, Martin Luther King, Jr. supported the idea of taking race into account. He once
explained,
It is impossible to create a formula for the future which does not take into
account that society has been doing something special against the Negro for
hundreds of years. How then can he be absorbed into the mainstream of
American society if we do not do something special for him now, in order
to balance the equation and equip him to compete on a just and equal basis?
Brief Amici, supra note 21, at 92. Like Dr. King, Dr. Bill Cosby has made statements,
specifically comments about lower income Blacks, that have been co-opted by conservatives.
See, e.g., Today: Armstrong Williams, Syndicated Columnist, and Joe Madison, Radio Talk
Show Host, Discuss Bill Cosby’s Comments About Needed Responsibility in the Black
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affirmative action should use Justice Thomas’s “request” for a re-parameterization of
admissions standards to meet that challenge and establish an in-road to overhauling
traditional standards that have worked to exclude many minorities and women.322
Indeed, as many scholars including Professors Derrick Bell and Lani Guinier have
argued, the short-term push for diversity as opposed to changes in merit standards has
served only as a distraction in efforts to achieve racial justice because it gives
“undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores that privilege
well-to-do, mainly white applicants.”323 In fact, the emphasis on grades and test scores
conceals less obvious class biases in traditional admissions processes, such as
expensive test preparation courses, personal tutors, and significant counseling and
mentoring in private schools.324 Most importantly, the notion that traditional factors
objectively measure merit hides the fact such standards favor only a small group of
largely privileged people, with seventy-four percent of students at the 146 most
selective colleges coming from the upper twenty-five percent of the socioeconomic

Community (NBC television broadcast, May 24, 2004) (transcript available at LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NBC News File); see also Theodore Shaw, Even Cosby Knows There Is More to the
Story, TOPEKA CAP.-J., June 3, 2004, at A4 (stating that “conservatives are applauding Bill
Cosby for saying that the problems of the black community stem primarily from personal
failures and moral shortcomings”). In a speech during a gala commemorating the fiftieth
anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Bill Cosby complained
about “lower economic” Blacks “not holding up their end in this deal.” Among other things,
Cosby stated, “Brown versus Board of Education is no longer the white person’s problem.
[Black people] have got to take the neighborhood back. . . . They are standing on the corner and
they can’t speak English.” George Curry, Bill Cosby Stands Behind Critical Comments,
ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, May 27, 2004, available at www.zwire.com.
322.
See, e.g., Kidder, supra note 122, at 172–218 (establishing that the LSAT is
biased against women, people of color, and other outsiders).
323.
Bell, supra note 267, at 1622 (expressing his view that Grutter may not have
been the victory it was perceived to be); see also Sturm & Guinier, supra note 107, at 957; Lani
Guinier, Our Preference for the Privileged, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2004, at A13 (“Too many
universities use their admissions criteria to consolidate privilege rather than expand
opportunity. . . . Admissions decisions reflect a preoccupation with measures of excellence that
tell us more about grandparents’ wealth than first-year college grades. . . . It disadvantages
poor and working-class whites, not just people of color, who may need time to transition
academically but who graduate and become leaders in their community at higher rates than
their higher-scoring white counterparts. We should evaluate what students will do after
graduation, not just during the first year of study.” (emphasis added)). Others, such as Justice
Thomas, have argued that the focus on diversity harms minorities because it sets them up to
fail. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (“These overmatched students take the bait,
only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.”); see also THOMAS
SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 177 (1994) (“Even if most minority students are able to meet the
normal standards at the ‘average’ range of colleges and universities, the systematic
mismatching of minority students begun at the top can mean that such students are generally
overmatched throughout all levels of higher education.”).
324.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 148–49 (detailing upper middle-class bias in
admissions and asserting that “[q]uantative measures often reflect family resources and
influence rather than a student’s resourcefulness or intelligence”).
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ladder, only three percent coming from the bottom twenty-five percent, and roughly
ten percent coming from the bottom fifty percent.325
Furthermore, as Justice Thomas alluded to in his dissent,326 because the
benefits flowing from diversity are so great, a rejection of those standards that are
traditionally used in admissions and in certain jobs327 should not sacrifice the quality
of schools or businesses. This would prove especially true in the school context if a
broad base of schools rejected such standards, forcing the extremely influential
institutions responsible for “ranking” colleges, such as the U.S. News and World
Report magazine,328 to develop new methods for measuring the quality of schools.329
In fact, such a broad-based rejection of standardized test scores is brewing at the
college level at a number of elite undergraduate institutions, including Bowdoin and
Bates Colleges in Maine, Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts, and Hamilton
College in New York.330 Instead of relying so heavily on standardized test scores,331
325.
Id. at 148 (citing Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, The Century
Foundation, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, Mar.
2003, at 8, available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/carnevale_rose.pdf).
326.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
327.
Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative
Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1253–54, 1256–77 (1995) (explicating that
“employment tests are typically weak predictors of potential productivity and that individual
test scores are inaccurate measures of an individual’s true abilities as those abilities are
measured by the examination”).
328.
In 1998, John Sexton, then the Dean of the New York University School of
Law, led 164 out of 180 ABA-approved law schools in drafting and signing a letter that advised
law school applicants to conduct individual research on each school and to not rely on the
rankings from the U.S. News and World Report. See Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, City Has 3 Top Law
Schools/Rates Nation’s Best, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 1998, at 4 (describing law schools’
criticism of the rankings). According to Sexton, “a ranking system inherently assumes that
every applicant has identical needs and desires.” Law School Rankings Evoke Defense, BUFF.
NEWS, Feb. 20, 1998, at A14. See also Guinier, supra note 84, at 145–46 (explaining that the
“facial neutrality of . . . rankings hides not only their arbitrariness, but also their value choices
and tendency to perpetuate existing privilege” and that “quantitative measures can be . . .
misused to hold [institutions] accountable to one-size-fits-all standards that discourage pursuit
of [their] . . . educational mission”); Robert W. Hillman, The Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility:
Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and the Education of Lawyers, 91 KY. L.J. 299, 310 (2002–2003)
(contending that “published law school rankings reflect[] a unitary model of legal education by
measuring the worth of all law schools by reference to the standards of the elite few”). The
American Association of Law Schools has called for the magazine to stop publishing its
rankings. See Dana Coleman, Jersey Deans: Enough Already with the Surveys!, N.J. LAW.,
Mar. 9, 1998, at 5 (describing the objection to the rankings by law school deans in New
Jersey).
329.
See Guinier, supra note 84, at 206 (arguing that situating merit within structures
of opportunity can encourage schools to focus more on long-term commitments to service and
community leadership).
330.
See Editorial, A Healthy SAT Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A14; 391
Schools That Do Not Use SAT I or ACT Scores for Admitting Substantial Numbers of Students
into Bachelor Degree Programs, available at www.fairtest.org/optstat.htm#NY.
331.
Students can voluntarily choose to submit their test scores.
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these schools do not require the submission of SAT or ACT scores, but instead request
more essays, interviews, and any other information that may help the admissions
committee in assessing a student’s ability to succeed at the school. These schools have
decided to ask themselves the difficult questions about how to tailor their processes to
determine who will actually contribute to the fulfillment of their schools’ missions,
instead of relying solely on standards that many agree are not perfect predictors for
success.332 Other schools and businesses should follow suit. In fact, after twenty years
without the SAT as a requirement for admission, Bates College recently presented
findings from a study of its students over the same period. As the college reported,
there was virtually no difference between the academic performance or the graduation
rate of applicants who had not submitted their SAT scores and those who voluntarily
did so.333 Specifically, Bates found that, between 1985 to 1999, those who did not
submit SAT scores earned an average grade point average of 3.06, just slightly lower
than those who chose to submit SAT scores, who earned an average grade point
average of 3.11.334 Additionally, Bates found that the graduation rate for those who
did not submit SAT scores was just slightly higher than for those who chose not to
submit scores—86.7 percent compared to 86.6 percent.335 Moreover, the school found
that the SAT-optional policy had helped it not only increase its applicant pool but also
attract a more diverse student body.336
In the end, perhaps Justice Thomas has a point, both in his selection to the
Court and in his “call” to re-parameterize standards of merit—that decision-makers in
schools and in the workplace should truly explore the range of possibilities available
for defining merit. What then is the real challenge for supporters of affirmative action
in the next few years? Supporters should use all the tools available to dismantle the
“master’s house,” with Justice Clarence Thomas even serving as one of those tools
“working the right way.”337

332.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) (acknowledging that
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EDUC., Oct. 15, 2004, at I8.
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